Secure Group Communication in Asynchronous Networks with Failures: Integration and Experiments*

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Abstract

The increasing popularity and diversity of collaborative applications prompts a need for highly secure and reliable communication platforms for dynamic peer groups. Security mechanisms for such groups tend to be both expensive and complex and their integration with reliable group communication services presents a formidable challenge.

This paper discusses some important integration issues, reports on our implementation experience and provides experimental results. Our approach utilizes distributed group key management developed by the Cliques project. We enhance it to handle processor and network faults (under a fail-stop or crash-and-recover model) and asynchronous membership events (such as joins, leaves, merges and network partitions). Our approach leverages the strong properties provided by the Spread group communication system, such as message ordering, clean failure semantics and a membership service. The result of this work is a secure group communications layer and an API that provide the application programmer with both standard group communication services and flexible security services.

1 Introduction

Fault-tolerant, scalable, and reliable communication services have become critical in modern computing. A major focus today is in taking traditional, centralized services such as file sharing, authentication, web, and mail services, and distributing them across multiple systems and networks. These distributed applications and other inherently collaborative applications (such as conferencing, white-boards, shared instrument control, and command-and-control systems) are very difficult to implement. One common and successful approach to developing these types of applications is to use a reliable group communication toolkit as a base messaging and fault-tolerant service.

Reliable group communication systems offer a set of low-level services that provide efficient messaging, membership, ordering and fault-detection services to peer groups. Typically, distributed and collaborative applications require fairly low latency message delivery of both small and large messages. They may involve many-to-many communication patterns. The number of membership events that these applications generate can vary from one every few minutes or hours to tens of membership changes per second. Commonly, however, the number of joins or leaves is at most a few per second and network failures or recoveries causing merges of groups or partitions are at most a few an hour. Thus, we aim for the secure group communication system to support that level of performance in a practical setting.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next two subsections outline, in general terms, security problems in peer groups and justify our focus on group key management. Section 2 details our security goals and the various issues arising in group key management. Then, Sections 3 and 4 provide an overview of the Spread group communication toolkit and the Cliques group key management service, respectively. Next, the secure Spread architecture is described in Section 5. Section 6 illustrates and discusses some experimental results obtained with secure Spread, and Section 7 summarizes the related work. Section 8 concludes the paper with the discussion of on-going and future work.

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1.1 Security in Peer Groups

Just as many-to-many peer group communication tends to be much more complex than two-party communication, security in a multi-party setting is much harder to define, specify and achieve.

Communication channel specifics have relatively little impact on the ability of **two** parties to communicate securely. An unreliable communication channel may drop or corrupt data but, at worst, it can only prevent communication. Well-known cryptographic methods can be utilized to assure data privacy, data integrity, source authentication and other properties. Moreover, techniques exist for hiding the communication patterns, thus preventing hostile traffic analysis. As a result, the adversary's choice is reduced to a binary one: either to allow communication or to prevent it altogether.

In contrast, secure group communication is very dependent on the composition of the group. A group, unlike a pair of end-points, mutates over time. If we collapse all pairwise channels within a group into a single group channel, its state cannot be expressed as a binary value. Fluctuations in the group channel state cause and are caused by members joining and leaving the group. To achieve the highest level of security, every state fluctuation must be accompanied by a corresponding adjustment to group security parameters. Of these, the most apparent is the group shared keying material or group secret.

This leads to a classical case of a *chicken-and-egg* problem: security events must immediately follow group state change events yet the latter are not themselves secure. However, we argue that certain group communication events are fundamentally impossible to secure. Notably, these include all kinds of fault-like events leading to group partitions and involuntary member disconnects. As a concrete example, consider the situation where network faults and individual node disconnects constantly perturb group membership. In this setting, trying to differentiate between two possible causes: 1) a clever adversary and 2) a truly faulty network, is impossible. Other events, such as members joining a group (whether as singletons or *en masse*) can, indeed, be made secure.

Finally, there is the all-important matter of trust. Trust, a very vague notion in a two-party case, becomes even more vague in a group context. As group membership changes, trust among group members may change over time.

1.2 Our Security Focus

The purpose of the above discussion is to motivate the need for specialized group security mechanisms. Since routine security services such as bulk data privacy and data integrity are usually contingent upon sharing a common secret (group key), establishing and managing group keying material is the most fundamental group security mechanism.

We thus concentrate on group key management, its integration with a reliable group communication platform and its impact on the latter. We also consider the impact of data privacy and data integrity, however, these services are not much different in peer groups from those in a traditional two-party communication setting.

There are tradeoffs to be made when choosing what type of key management protocols a security system should use. These include number of messages sent per event, number of participants per event, amount of serial computation and overall computation done by the group per event, fault tolerance, amount of trust in members of the group and fairness of load distribution. We discuss these tradeoffs as we evaluate two group key management protocols: a distributed key management protocol suite based on the Cliques work, and a centralized protocol providing a roughly equivalent level of security.

In tackling the security issues in reliable group communication we do not (yet) consider certain components that are needed for comprehensive security.

- Group access control and, more generally, group policy.
- Group and member certification.

While we do not aim to underestimate their importance, the research in this area is just beginning [1]. We believe that well-designed group key management and data security protocols can be coupled with an *ad hoc* policy framework and be deployed rapidly. We further believe that the same group key management system can be coupled with a better policy framework when such exists.

2 Security Goals

Our main security goal is both natural and fairly standard: to achieve authentic and private communication within a group. Although this requirement can be expressed in any secure group setting – in a dynamic peer group context – it leads to a number of interesting corollaries. The second security goal is to provide authentic and private communication between a secure group (i.e., its members) and other entities (non-members). Finally, the third goal is to obtain strong authentication and non-repudiation of individual group members both within and outside a group.[1]

[1] That is, a secure group can be viewed as a microcosm of sorts where authentication and non-repudiation of individuals is at the granularity of members, not permanent identities.

So-called *conventional* cryptography requires two or more parties to share a common secret in order to communicate securely. In contrast, public key cryptography [2] allows two parties who do not share a common secret to communicate securely. Owing to its computational cost (orders of magnitude greater than that of conventional encryption) public key encryption can be used to secure communication between two parties only when a very small amount of data is involved. In practice, public key encryption is used only as a means to distribute or agree upon a common secret key which is subsequently used with conventional cryptography to provide authenticity and privacy of bulk data.

To obtain security in a peer group setting, we can construct an obvious extension to any two-party security mechanism (such as SSL or SSH) by establishing N^2 (where N is the group size) pair-wise secure channels among all group members. Each pair-wise channel would then be associated with a unique secret key known only to the two endpoints. In order to send private data to the group, the sender would have to encrypt it $(N-1)$ times (once for every recipient) producing as many copies which would then be sent individually to each recipient or conglomerated into a single message and broadcasted to the entire group. It is easy to see that this approach involves horrendous overhead both in terms of computation and bandwidth consumed.[2]

2.1 Group Key Management

The above discussion essentially implies that, practically speaking, neither private nor authentic communication within a group can be achieved without some sort of a common group secret. Consequently, the starting point for security is a set of mechanisms for obtaining and maintaining such a secret. We refer to this collectively as the group key management problem.

Besides the fact that it forms the basis of all other security services, there are two other important reasons for our focus on group key management:

- The security of group key management itself is of paramount importance. Data privacy, authenticity, and integrity mechanisms are formed by defining a message format and selecting a basic underlying algorithm, i.e., a block cipher such as DES[4][3] for privacy and a keyed MAC[4] such as HMAC [5] for data integrity. Whereas, key management mechanisms involve intricate *protocols* in addition to methods. An adversary aiming to attack a system is unlikely to waste efforts on attacking privacy and integrity mechanisms since key management presents a much more attractive target.

- The cost of group key management represents a "pure" form of security overhead. Compared with the cost of encryption (which can be done with almost no overhead if certain types of stream ciphers are used) or integrity (which can be obtained with certain Gigabit-speed MACs), key management typically requires relatively heavy-weight arithmetic operations and additional communication among group members.

2.2 Centralized vs Distributed Key Management

The main issues in group key management center around **who** generates a group key as well as **how** and **when** it is generated. The **when** part is relatively simple, since, in the extreme, a new key must be generated following every group membership change. The **who** and **how** issues are more involved as they collectively determine the actual key management protocol(s).

If the group key is generated by a single party who then distributes it to all other group members we call the key management *centralized*; whereas, if all members participate in key generation we call the key management *distributed*.[5]

Centralized key management takes on two flavors: TTP-based or controller-based. The first is based on the notion of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) which is a fixed, highly secure entity (e.g., a Kerberos Authentication Server [6]) charged with user authentication as well as generation and distribution of keys. Since a TTP is fixed, this approach cannot tolerate TTP partitions or TTP failures and is thus of limited utility in a peer group. An alternative is to fix a certain group member (e.g., oldest or newest) as a group controller whose duty is to generate and distribute keys to the group. Failures or partitions of a group controller can be effectively dealt with by selecting an appropriate member within the remaining group. This approach is workable and we are in fact using it as a point of comparison in the experimental results (see Section 6 and Appendix). However, it does not allow for the authentication of individual group members which is one of our security goals. Furthermore, a fixed controller presents an attractive attack target since it is the only member entrusted with the security of the entire group. Another drawback is the inability to authenticate certain membership changes.

Distributed key management involves all group members collectively generating or agreeing upon a group key. The Cliques protocol suite, described in detail in Section 4,

[2] We note that the only exception is its use in secure multi-destination electronic mail, such as PEM [3], where recipient "groups" are constructed on a per-message basis.

[3] Data Encryption Standard.

[4] Message Authentication Code.

[5] For the sake of clarity we do not consider hybrid methods, i.e., a subset of members generating a group key.

falls into this category. A group secret is essentially a function of all group members' individual contributions. At the same time, a member's contribution is known only to that member; this property aids in the authentication of individual members (since a member can show that it knows a unique and secret portion of a common group secret.) The often-cited drawbacks of distributed key management are the relative complexity and the computational overhead of the cryptographic protocols that implement it. On the other hand, as illustrated by experimental results in Section 6, the overhead is actually comparable to that of centralized controller-based key management.

3 The Spread Group Communication Toolkit

The group security services discussed in this paper are built on top of the Spread wide-area group communication system [7].

Spread is a group communication system for local area and wide area networks. Spread provides all the services of traditional group communication systems, including unreliable and reliable delivery, FIFO, causal, and total ordering, and membership services with strong semantics.

Spread creates an overlay network that can impose any arbitrary network configuration including for example, point-to-multi-point, trees, rings, trees-with-subgroups and any combinations of them to adapt the system to different networking environments. The Spread architecture allows multiple protocols to be used on links between sites and within a site.

Spread is very useful for applications that need the traditional group communication services such as causal and total ordering, and membership and delivery guarantees, but also need to run over wide area networks.

In addition, other applications may find Spread useful because of some other technical properties:

- Scalability with the number of collaboration sessions. Spread can support large number of different collaboration sessions, each of which spans the Internet but has only a small number of participants. The reason is that Spread utilizes *unicast* messages on the wide area network, routing them between Spread nodes on the overlay network.

- Scalability with the number of groups. Spread can scale well with the number of groups used by the application without imposing any overhead on network routers. Group naming and addressing is no longer a shared resource (the IP address for multicast) but rather a large space of strings which is unique per collaboration session.

- Spread supports the Extended Virtual Synchrony model [8] and the View Synchrony model [9] which provide strong semantic guarantees about membership events and message delivery.

- Spread uses a daemon-client architecture. This architecture has many benefits, the most important for wide-area settings is the resultant ability to pay the minimum necessary price for different causes of group membership changes. Simple join and leave of processes translates into a single message. A daemon disconnection or connection does not pay the heavy cost involved in changing wide area routes. Only network partitions between different local area components of the network requires the heavy cost of full-fledged membership change. Luckily, there is a strong inverse relationship between the frequency of these events and their cost in a practical system. The process and daemon membership correspond to the more common model of "Lightweight Groups" and "Heavyweight Groups"[RG98].

The Spread toolkit is available publicly. An early version of the system is used by several organizations for both research and practical projects. The toolkit supports cross-platform applications and has been ported to several Unix platforms as well as Windows and Java environments.[6]

3.1 Supported Group Communication Semantics

Spread supports the Extended Virtual Synchrony (EVS) model [8] [10] and the View Synchrony (VS) model [9]. Both EVS and VS guarantee that group members see the same set of messages between two sequential group membership events. They also both guarantee that the order of messages requested by the application (such as FIFO, Causal, or Total) is preserved. EVS provides a more general service; VS semantics can be implemented on top of EVS semantics without performance penalties, but EVS can not be implemented on top of VS without a significant latency penalty.

EVS provides three general benefits over VS: it has better performance, prevents applications from blocking the system, and allows open groups where non-members of a group can send messages to the group. EVS guarantees that messages are delivered to all recipients in the same membership as the message was originally sent on the network.

The last EVS property above is the critical difference between VS and EVS. VS, in contrast, guarantees the stricter property that messages are delivered to all recipients in the same membership as the sending application thought it was

[6] More details on the Spread system can be found at *http://www.spread.org/* along with a white paper and programming documentation.

a member of at the time it sent the message. Providing this property requires a round of application acknowledgement messages before installing a new membership. This need for application level acknowledgements requires that the groups be closed, only allowing members of the group to send messages to it.

This knowledge that a message is received in the membership the application believed it was sent in which is provided by VS semantics makes implementing a secure group system much easier because every message is encrypted with the same key as the receiver believes is current when the message is delivered to them.

The services provided by a security layer almost require closed groups[7] because only the members of the group have the shared group key with which to encrypt or sign messages. Additionally, to implement a group key agreement protocol on top of EVS would require the security layer to implement semantics similar to those of VS to correctly maintain which messages were sent using which key. Thus, we do not see any significant benefit to building security requiring only EVS semantics.

The Spread system provides Extended Virtual Synchrony. A flush layer built atop spread (provided with the Spread system) provides the View Synchrony model.

4 Overview of Cliques and CLQ_API

Cliques [11, 12, 13] is a cryptographic protocol suite which provides authenticated contributory group key management and other security services. Cliques' protocols guarantee key independence, key confirmation, perfect forward secrecy and resistance to known key attacks. (We refer to [14] for detailed definitions of these attacks.) In short, Cliques guarantees that group keys cannot be obtained by either active or passive attackers. Moreover, past group members (alone or in collusion) cannot obtain group keys subsequent to leaving the group and, similarly, current group members cannot obtain group keys used before they joined the group. Cliques is based on group extensions of the well-known Diffie-Hellman [2] key exchange technique.

Cliques defines a special role for a group controller, the last member to join a group. This role floats as the group membership changes. A controller is charged with initiating key adjustments following membership changes. Other than that, it has no special security tasks or privileges.

CLQ_API [15] is a group key agreement API built on top of the Cliques protocol suite. Its main purpose is to implement the cryptographic primitives of Cliques. The underlying communication system is assumed to deal with the group communication and network events such as partitions, failures and other abnormalities. CLQ_API is small and concise containing only eight function calls.

Cliques guarantees two system invariants:

1. All group members always agree on the identity of the current group controller.
   At any point in time, the controller is the newest (most recently joined) group member.

2. A group secret key is always contributed to equally by each and every group member.
   At any point in time, a group secret is a function of all members' private shares. Only current group members have access to the group secret.

Cliques supports the following group key agreement operations:

- Join: a new member is added to the group.
- Merge: one or more members are added to the group.
- Leave: one or more members are removed from (or leave) the group.
- Key Refresh: generates a new group secret.

All of these result in the same outcome, i.e., the group secret is changed such that: all members obtain the same authenticated key.

The rest of this section briefly explains how the CLQ_API performs the above operations. (For details, the reader is referred to [15].) The group secret for n members is of the form $g^{N_1 N_2 \ldots N_n} \pmod p$, where N_i is the member M_i's private share, p is large prime number and g is the generator in Z_p^*. Both p and g are agreed-upon systemwide parameters just as in the plain two-party Diffie-Hellman setting [2].

4.1 Join

1. The group controller generates a new private share and computes partial group secrets, one for each existing group member. Then, it hands over the partial group secrets to the joining member, who is slated to become the new controller.

2. After receiving the information, the new member adds its own share to the partial group secrets of all users and broadcasts the result to the entire group.

3. Upon reception of the broadcasted message, every user computes the group secret.

[7] This is not true with a daemon based implementation.

4.2 Merge

The MERGE operation in Cliques requires the list of merging members to be available to the current group controller. At the end of MERGE, the last member in this list becomes the new group controller.

1. The current controller generates a new private share and computes a new partial group secret. This value is then sent openly to the first new (merging) member.
2. Each new member, in turn, adds its own private share to the group secret and sends it on to the next new member.
3. The last new member does not add its share but only broadcasts the partial group secret to the group.
4. Upon receipt of the broadcast, every member, except the last one, removes (factors out) its private share from the partial group secret and sends the result back to the last new member who now becomes the new group controller.
5. Having received all messages, the new controller computes a new partial group secret for all members by adding its own private share to every value it received. It then broadcasts the set of partial group secrets to the entire group.
6. Upon reception of the broadcast, every member computes the new group secret.

4.3 Leave

1. The current controller updates its private share, recomputes the partial group secrets for all remaining group members and broadcasts the result to the group.
2. Upon reception of the broadcast, each user computes the new group secret.

4.4 Key Refresh

Key refresh is identical to LEAVE with the exception that it is triggered unilaterally by the controller. (The API also support an option whereby any group member, not just the controller, can cause key refresh by updating its private share.)

5 Secure Spread Architecture

As mentioned previously, Spread supports both VS and EVS group semantics. Currently, secure Spread uses the VS group semantics. Also, Spread uses a daemon-client communication architecture. The current implementation of secure Spread is implemented as a layer that extends the Spread client library by adding the new security features discussed in this paper. Client applications then link with this secure library and use the provided API which is similar to regular Spread API. A different way to construct a secure Spread would be to graft the security features directly into the Spread daemon. We refer to these two approaches as the client model and the daemon model, respectively. The benefits of each model are the drawbacks of the other.

The client model has the advantage that the implementation of the daemon only has to be trusted to correctly implement the ordering, reliability, and membership services. The daemon is not responsible for any cryptographic or security services. However, providing a correct implementation of the ordering services, is not a trivial requirement, security wise. In systems that use unsecured networks, it is very possible to subvert the ordering guarantees provided by a group communication system. This can be done by modifying the content of the data messages the daemons send between each other. Because the system is message based and not stream-based, the client layer has no way of detecting mis-ordered messages without reimplementing a full agreed-ordering protocol. This is in contrast with point-to-point secure communication systems such as SSH[18] which run on top of TCP. In these point-to-point systems, if the packets between two nodes are modified or reordered the SSH decryption/integrity checks will detect a corruption even if TCP does not. Thus, the daemons must deploy some mechanisms to protect against malicious network attackers even in the client model.

Note, that even with this requirement of some trust in the daemons, the client model requires less trust then the daemon model. In a corporate network, all the employees may trust that a shared Spread network setup by the system administrator, will correctly perform ordering and reliability services. However, they may not trust that their data will remain confidential when sent through the Spread network (because the system administrator could read it). Therefore, they would want to encrypt it at the client level.

The main advantages of the client model are that a different, and often lesser, amount of trust is placed in the daemon, that the implementation as a library can rely on the Spread application semantics, and that all cryptographic code is under the control of the end user. Another advantage is that the client-based design demonstrates how to secure any group communication system that supports the VS model.

The daemon model denies an end user access to the security implementation, especially if the daemon network is out of the end user's control. However, it does offer several advantages. The main advantage is a substantial increase in performance. Keys would no longer need to be estab-

lished for every group. Instead, the daemons could encode all of their communication using one daemon group key. Daemons are long lived entities and might only update this key if their connectivity changed or a daemon crashed or recovered (daemons could also choose to refresh their key occasionally). These kind of events are much rarer than individual processes joining or leaving a group. Therefore, in the daemon model the number of key agreements occurring in the system as a whole would be drastically reduced in comparison to the client model. Note, however, that communication between clients and daemons would still have to be secured in some manner. For example, a client could assume that IPC is secure, or use encrypted communications such as SSL sockets.

Another advantage of the daemon model is that security policy can be easily configured and enforced. In this model an administrator could change policy by editing the daemon's configuration. End users connecting to daemons could be authenticated upon connection. Access control to the daemons or specific groups could be easily enforced. Daemons could also easily authenticate that users are members of specific groups.

To summarize, despite all of the apparent advantages in using the daemon model, the client model has a confidentiality advantage over the daemon model. In the daemon model, if a daemon key is obtained, all messages in every group are compromised until the daemons re-key. In contrast, in the client model, if a group key is obtained, only the messages in that group are compromised until the group rekeys. Due to the different levels of security offered by the two models, both approaches are useful.

5.1 High Level Design

A major consideration when designing a secure communications toolkit is that security and trust depend on the algorithms used in the toolkit. As time goes on, trust in these algorithms may change: ciphers are broken, algorithms are proven insecure, better algorithms are designed, etc. Therefore, any system hoping to secure communications and be viable in the long run, needs to be flexible and easily modified. Another desirable feature is that security policy can be easily changed by administrators and/or users. One way to achieve these goals is to design an extremely modular system.

Figure 1 shows a basic architecture for a modular secure system. When necessary, the secure group layer calls different modules that implement encryption, key management, and key generation routines. If the secure layer only needs to know when to call these modules, but not their functions, then this type of design allows for drop-in replacement of different modules. Therefore, if a new module needs to be added, then only two modifications have to be made. First, code must be written implementing the new module. Second, the module must be chosen to run at the proper times.



Figure 1. A Generic Secure Architecture

5.2 Secure Spread Modules

The basic design of secure Spread follows this modular design closely. The core functionality of secure Spread is an event handling loop. Network events are generated by the VS group communication layer. Secure Spread takes each of these events and depending on their context, passes it on to the proper module that handles the event.

An interesting addition to the design of secure Spread is that the modules implementing the security policies and algorithms of the system can be chosen at run time as new groups are created. This mechanism allows different groups to choose different event handlers while simultaneously running in the same group communication system. For example, one group could decide to use centralized key management, while another group is using distributed key management at the same time.

Currently, secure Spread is designed to allow for drop in replacement of encryption and key agreement protocols. In the future we hope to extend the architecture to allow for modules that would make access control and other policy decisions as well. At this early stage of development, secure Spread has a small set of modules.

Figure 2 shows the current implementation of secure Spread. The Flush layer provides View Synchrony semantics to the secure Spread layer. Note that the application can have several connections open at the same time and each of them can be in multiple groups. Some of these groups can



Figure 2. Secure Spread Implementation

be secure, while others can instead use the View Synchrony semantics of the Flush layer or the EVS semantics provided by Spread. The application chooses which services to use.

Currently, for bulk data encryption secure Spread uses an open source implementation of Bruce Schneier's Blowfish algorithm [16]. In the near future we hope to add the ability to use the OpenSSL[17] cryptographic library which provides an abundant selection of encryption algorithms.

Secure Spread currently has two different modules for key agreement, both based on the Cliques protocol suite.

- Cliques key management (using group Diffie-Hellman).
- Simple centralized key management (described in the Appendix and Table 5).

The complexity of secure Spread is contained almost entirely within these modules.

5.3 Implementation of Cliques Group Key Management

The Cliques key management suite and the corresponding API presented in Section 4 are independent of a particular implementation of a group communication system. How these protocols are implemented specifically in secure Spread is the subject of this section.

In order to easily accommodate the Cliques protocols, the underlying group communication system needs to provide certain fundamental features. These include: group multicast, group member to group member unicast, FIFO ordering on messages, and a mechanism for knowing and identifying all of the members of a group. All of these services are provided by Spread.

Furthermore, the Cliques API is tuned to allow for the following types of membership changes: singleton join, singleton leave, multi-join, and multi-leave. Again, all of these types of membership events are provided by Spread. In addition, the VS model of Spread generates an event that is a combination multi-join and multi-leave, and an event requesting the application to OK a group membership change.

Implementing the Cliques protocols in a group communication system requires a mapping between group communication events and Cliques events. Presented in Table 1 is the simple mapping of Spread's VS group events to Cliques events.

Table 1. Mapping of Spread Events to Group Key Events

Spread VS Group Membership Events	Group Key Management Operations
Join	Join
Leave	Leave
Disconnect	Leave
Partition	Leave
Merge	Merge
Partition + Merge	Leave then Merge
Group Change Request	N/A
N/A	Key Refresh

When Spread generates a VS group event that event is passed up to the security layer. Secure Spread then examines the event and determines to which group the message corresponds. It then retrieves the event handler for that particular group and gives the event to the handler. This handler is responsible for mapping the network VS event into the set of proper actions to be taken. The handler considers both the current state of the group and the key agreement protocol as described in Section 4.

In our implementation, the Cliques protocols are implemented using state machines. The state machine and the current state of the member of the group will be collectively referred to as the "member state."

The member state and the current event affecting the group determine what actions are taken by each member. The Cliques library keeps most of the state information associated with a group, such as who is the current group controller. When calls are made to the CLQ_API, in general, all group members make the same function call and the return values of these calls determine how the member state of each member changes and what actions they take.

FIFO ordered messages are used to communicate partial

keys or key shares to the group or between particular entities. This is done because FIFO ordered messages have extremely low overhead, and stronger message orderings are not required.

5.4 Cascading Failure Handling

When merging security protocols with high reliability group communication protocols we must begin with an obvious premise that security does not imply robustness, i.e., a system can be secure but not robust. A security protocol does not become more secure when built over a reliable communication platform; it becomes more robust. For instance, many security protocols for group communication assume that messages are received in certain order or that all protocol parties are (at the same time) connected and ready to receive messages. In real systems these assumptions are often not fulfilled. Adding reliability through a group communication system can make these assumptions realistic and the protocols themselves – usable.

Focusing on the problem at hand, recall that fluctuations in group channel state must be coupled with group key adjustments. However, adjustments require the availability and reachability of each group member. If the group channel state changes while an adjustment (stemming from an earlier change) is in progress, appropriate actions must be taken not to maintain security but to preserve the overall group integrity. This is in stark contrast to two-party communication where such "cascading" fluctuations simply do not occur.

Thus, a significant challenge in integrating reliable group communication and group security protocols lies not in the straightforward mapping of well-spaced communication events into their security counterparts but in the proper and robust handling of various **cascading** events that perturb group channel state.

Thus far, we have implemented key agreement for non-cascading membership events. This allows us to benchmark the system and learn about its performance in essentially all common cases. Specifically, we compared the performance of centralized and decentralized join and leave operations.

The basic difficulty in handling cascading membership events arises because the key agreement protocol takes time and communication to generate a new key and subsequent membership changes can make completing that process either impossible, or make it produce incorrect results. Solving this problem requires modification of the key agreement protocol and the addition of cases handling all the possible changes at all possible times.

Note that one can not just use the VS properties which allow each application to delay the new membership until it is finished, because at the time the security layer is asked to OK a new membership change it does not yet know what the membership event is (Join/Leave/Partition) or who is involved. Thus, it can not know whether the event is safe to defer or not.



Figure 3. Spread and Flush Layer Timings

6 Experimental Results

In this section we present the experimental results obtained with secure Spread. We performed the experiments with two different machine architectures under the same group scenario. In the first set, all the machines were SUN Ultra-s 2 Model 1200 (200 MHz UltraSPARC, 128MB) running Solaris 5.5.1, while in the other set, all the machines were Pentium II (450 MHz, 128MB) running RedHat Linux 2.2.7. The timings were obtained by performing multiple batches of each operation 50 times and then averaging across batches. The setup consisted of three identical machines, each running its own Spread daemon. Two machines had a single member each and the third machine contained all other members (processes) utilizing a single daemon. An Ethernet 10BaseT network connected the SUN Ultra-2s and an Ethernet 100BaseT network connected the Pentium II machines. The CLQ_API was linked with OpenSSL 0.9.3a [17], where one Diffie-Hellman (DH) exponentiation with 512-bit modulus costs 12 and 2.5 msecs for the SUN and Pentium platforms, respectively.

The total number[8] of serial exponentiations required for Join and Leave operations is illustrated in Tables 2 and 3,

[8]During the join operation n includes the new member and during the leave operation n includes the leaving member.

Table 2. Detailed number of exponentiation for Join

Cliques	Controller	Update key share with every member	$n-1$
		Long term key computation with new member	1
		New session key computation	1
		Total:	$n+1$
	New Member	Long term key computations	$n-1$
		Encryption of session key	$n-1$
		New session key computation	1
		Total:	$2n-1$
CKD	Controller	Long term key computation with new member	1
		Pairwise key computation with new member	1
		New session key computation	1
		Encryption of session key	$n-1$
		Total:	$n+2$
	New Member	Long term key computation with controller	1
		Pairwise key computation with controller	1
		Encryption of pairwise secret for controller	1
		Decryption of session key	1
		Total:	4

Table 3. Detailed number of exponentiation for Leave

Cliques	Remove long term key with previous controller	1
	New session key computation	1
	Encryption of session key	$n-2$
	Total:	n
CKD	New session key computation	1
	Encryption of session key	$n-2$
	Total:	$n-1$
CKD, when controller leaves	Long term key computations	$n-2$
	Pairwise key computation with new user	$n-2$
	New session key computation	1
	Encryption of session key	$n-2$
	Total:	$3n-5$

Table 4. Total number of serial exponentiation

Operation	Join	Leave	Controller leaves
Number of members after operation	n	$n-1$	$n-1$
Cliques	$3n$	n	n
CKD	$n+6$	$n-1$	$3n-5$



Figure 4. Timings

respectively. Table 4 summarizes the total number of serial exponentiations performed in the course of each operation.

Figure 3 shows the total time of one join or leave operation, which costs the same, versus the group size.[9] The time in this graph includes the network overhead. The Flush layer timings in the graph are not linear due to the fact that n messages have to be broadcast from each member to all others. Further, the fact that 28 clients were running on one machine (in the size 30 test) required $(n-2)n$ work local to that machine. In practice, the client would be more widely distributed.

Figure 4 presents the total time of Join and Leave operations versus the group size in two separate graphs. The times reported in these graphs are CPU times as measured by the `getrusage()` function. The graphs seem to follow closely the total number of expected exponentiations in Tables 2 and 3. Figure 3 shows the network overhead is very small in comparison with the time required for exponentiation even with relatively large groups. In other words, the results clearly show that exponentiation is the most dominant operation. Of the CPU time required for a join or leave, almost all of it is used by the exponentiation operations. For example, a join operation in a group of fifteen members takes 0.1125 seconds for the modular exponentiation and the total CPU time experimentally takes 0.1285 seconds for the Pentium. Hence, 88% of the CPU was used for modular exponentiation.

[9]The Flush layer values on the SPARC architecture are not included as they did not show anything new.

7 Related Work

Related work falls into three categories: 1) cryptographic protocols for group key management, 2) architectures and frameworks for secure multicast and 3) implementation of secure group communication systems. Given the "systems" orientation of this paper, we concentrate on (3). Readers interested in (1) are referred to [11] and [13]. We choose not to dwell on the related work in secure multicast since both its security and its communication models differ greatly from those of dynamic peer groups. Suffice it to say that it typically assumes one-to-many communication paradigm and emphasizes scalability over strong security; more specifically, the focus is on minimizing bandwidth overhead from re-keying a very large group.[10] Generation and distribution of group keys is assumed to be performed by trusted servers which, as discussed above, is an approach unsuitable for a peer group setting.

Group communication systems in LAN environments have a well-developed history beginning with ISIS [19], and more recent systems such as Transis [20], Horus [21], Totem [22], and RMP [23]. These systems explored several different models of Group Communication such as Virtual Synchrony [24] and Extended Virtual Synchrony [8]. More recent work in this area focuses on scaling group membership to Wide Area Networks (WANs) [25].

Research in securing group communication systems is

[10]Most recent work in secure multicast has taken place under the aegis of the Internet Research Task Force's (IRTF) Secure Multicast Group (SMUG); see *http://www.ipmulticast.com* for further information.

fairly recent. The only actual implementations of group communication systems focusing on security issues are the secure distributed CORBA (Immune) system built on top of SecureRing[26] group communication work at UCSB [27] and Horus/Ensemble work at Cornell [28]. (An earlier RAMPART system [29] at Cornell concentrated on Byzantine robustness.)

The Immune system from UCSB provides protection against Byzantine failures using cryptographic techniques to secure a low-level ring protocol (that forms the base of the Totem system) and replicating the protected CORBA objects sufficiently to detect and recover from up to a fixed number of compromised objects or machines.

The Ensemble security work [28] exemplifies the state-of-the-art in reliable group communication security and addresses several of the same problems we consider in this paper. It also allows application-dependent trust models and optimizes certain aspects of group key generation and distribution protocols. The problems we both address are in generating shared group keys and rekeying, however, our respective approaches are quite different.

Ensemble relies on extensions of conventional (i.e., not group-oriented) cryptographic tools such as PGP [30] or Kerberos [6] to distribute and refresh group keys. Our approach has two notable advantages (also summarized in Section 2.2):

First, our generation of group keys is distributed and uses a peer group model, while Ensemble uses centralized key generation (done by group leader). In Ensemble, the entire group relies on one member's ability to generate strong, secure keys. The group leader is the lowest-numbered member. The role of the group leader changes only if the current group leader leaves the group voluntarily or gets partitioned out.

Second, in Ensemble key distribution is performed with the help of encryption (via PGP) which is expensive since the key must be encrypted individually for each member. More importantly, compromise of just one member's long-term secret (PGP private key) exposes all previous group session keys, and, hence, all prior group communication. While this may suffice in practice, a more secure solution would provide so-called *Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)*. PFS guarantees that a compromise of a long-term secret (be it shared or private key) does not result in a compromise of previously used short-term secrets such as ephemeral group keys. In contrast, CLIQUES key agreement protocols avoid the use of encryption altogether and offer PFS.

Our approach also differs from Ensemble's as far as member authentication. A group member in Ensemble can be authenticated using a common group key or a member's long-term secret (e.g., Kerberos or PGP key). The former only authenticates membership and not a specific member while the latter authenticates a long-lived entity, not a group member. Although our approach supports both of these it allows a group member to authenticate based on its unique short-term secret, i.e., its secret contribution to the common group key.

Very recent follow-on work at Cornell produced some interesting decentralized (and optimized) group keying protocols [31]. The protocols are loosely based on the work of Wong et al. [32].

8 Future Work

This paper represents only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Much work remains to be done in constructing a comprehensive architecture and implementation for secure and reliable group communication.

At the time of this writing, work is under way to implement secure and robust handling of cascaded group events as sketched out in Section 5.

This paper focused on application (or client) security which is only the first step in securing Spread. Since the core functions of Spread are embodied in the daemon, the next logical task is to integrate Cliques security mechanisms into the Spread daemons. This would result in the security of the membership change events themselves and remove undue trust assumptions about the security of the daemons.

More experimentation is needed to better assess the impact of security on group communication. In the short term, we need to consider other important and more specialized group security services that can be built on top of the basic services, i.e., distributed key management and data privacy/integrity. These include intra-group member authentication, secure communication with non-members, group integrity, group/member anonymity, and membership non-repudiation.

There are also several fundamental, long-term research topics that this work has not addressed. Dynamic peer groups present interesting policy considerations that traditional two-party communication does not. New policy constraints might include: altering group membership; policy contingent on current membership; time based group admission constraints. Group certification is also an open research problem, including such issues as: how to issue, manage and revoke certificates for constantly changing groups. Finally, there is the need to extend peer group security to two-tiered groups composed of small number of senders and a comparatively large number of receivers.

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Protocol CKD: Let (x_1, α^{x_1}) and (x_{n+1}, $\alpha^{x_{n+1}}$) be the secret and public keys of M_1, the group controller, and M_{n+1} respectively. Let $K_{1n+1} = \alpha^{x_1 x_{n+1}}$ mod p. Assume that the group has n members, and that M_{n+1} wants to join the group.
The protocol runs as follows:
Round 1:
M_1 selects random $r_1 modq$ (this selection is performed only once),
$M_1 \longrightarrow M_{n+1} : \alpha^{r_1} modp$
Round 2:
M_{n+1} selects random $r_{n+1} modq$,
$M_1 \longleftarrow M_{n+1} : \alpha^{r_{n+1} K_{1n+1}} modp$
Round 3:
M_1 selects a random group secret Ks and computes
$M_1 \longrightarrow M_i : Ks^{\alpha^{r_1 r_i}} modp \forall i \in [2..n+1]$

Table 5. CKD protocol

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A Centralized Key Distribution protocol

The Centralized Key Distribution (CKD) protocol is a simple group key distribution scheme. It provides the same level of security as Cliques, as far as key independence, key confirmation, perfect forward secrecy and resistance to known key attacks. However, it is not contributory as the group secret is always generated by one member, namely, the current group controller.[11] Following each membership change, the current controller generates the secret and distributes it to the group in a secure manner. Unlike Cliques, the controller is always the oldest member. The protocol is shown in Table 5

Regardless of the group operation, the CKD key distribution protocol consists of two phases:

1. Each group member and the controller agree on a key using authenticated two-party Diffie-Hellman.
   This key does not need to change as long as both users remain in the group. If the controller leaves the group, the new controller has to perform this operation with every member. On the other hand, if a regular member leaves, the controller simply discards this key.

2. The group controller unilaterally generates and distributes the group secret.

[11] We use the term *current* to mean that, even in the CKD protocol suite, a controller can fail or be partitioned out thus causing the controller role to be reassigned to the oldest surviving member.