# EE515/IS523 Think Like an Adversary Lecture 2 Intro+Crypto

# Yongdae Kim KAIST




#### **Admin**

- □ Homepage
  - http://security101.kr
- □ Survey
  - Find your group members and discuss about projects



# Design Hierarchy

- □ What are we trying to do?
- □ How?
- □ With what?
- Considerations
  - Top-down vs. Bottom-up
  - Iterative
  - Convergence
  - environment change





## Goals: Confidentiality

 Confidentiality of information means that it is accessible only by authorized entities

- Contents, Existence, Availability, Origin,
   Destination, Ownership, Timing, etc... of:
- Memory, processing, files, packets, devices, fields, programs, instructions, strings...



# Goals: Integrity

Integrity means that information can only be modified by authorized entities

- e.g. Contents, Existence, Availability, Origin,
   Destination, Ownership, Timing, etc... of:
- Memory, processing, files, packets, devices, fields, programs, instructions, strings...



# Goals: Availability

Availability means that authorized entities can access a system or service.

- A failure of availability is often called Denial of Service:
  - Packet dropping
  - Account freezing
  - Jamming
  - Queue filling



# Goals: Accountability

□ Every action can be traced to "the responsible party."

- □ Example attacks:
  - Microsoft cert
  - Guest account
  - Stepping stones



# Goals: Dependability

- A system can be relied on to correctly deliver service
- □ Dependability failures:
  - Therac-25: a radiation therapy machine
    - » whose patients were given massive overdoses (100 times) of radiation
    - » bad software design and development practices: impossible to test it in a clean automated way
  - Ariane 5: expendable launch system
    - » the rocket self-destructing 37 seconds after launch because of a malfunction in the control software
    - » A data conversion from 64-bit floating point value to 16bit signed integer value



## Interacting Goals

- □ Failures of one kind can lead to failures of another, e.g.:
  - Integrity failure can cause Confidentiality failure
  - Availability failure can cause integrity, confidentiality failure
  - ▶ Etc...



#### **Threat Model**

What property do we want to ensure against what adversary?

- Who is the adversary?
- □ What is his goal?
- What are his resources?
  - ▶ e.g. Computational, Physical, Monetary...
- What is his motive?
- □ What attacks are out of scope?



## **Terminologies**

- Attack (Exploit): attempt to breach system security (DDoS)
- Threat: a scenario that can harm a system (System unavailable)
- □ Vulnerability: the "hole" that allows an attack to succeed (TCP)
- □ Security goal: "claimed" objective; failure implies insecurity



#### Who are the attackers?

#### □ No more script-kiddies


















#### State-Sponsored Attackers

- 2012. 6: Google starts warning users who may be targets of government-sponsored hackers
- □ 2010 ~: Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, Gauss, ...
  - Mikko (2011. 6): A Pandora's Box We Will Regret Opening
- □ 2010 ~: Cyber Espionage from China
  - Exxon, Shell, BP, Marathon Oil, ConocoPhillips, Baker Hughes
  - Canada/France Commerce Department, EU parliament
  - RSA Security Inc. SecurID
  - Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Mitsubushi



#### Hacktivists

- promoting expressive politics, free speech, human rights, and information ethics
- Anonymous
  - To protest against SOPA, DDoS against MPAA, RIAA, FBI, DoJ, Universal music
  - Attack Church of Scientology
  - Support Occupy Wall Street

#### □ LulzSec

- Hacking Sony Pictures (PSP jailbreaking)
- Hacking Pornography web sites
- DDoSing CIA web site (3 hour shutdown)





## Security Researchers

They tried to save the world by introducing new attacks on systems

#### □ Examples

- Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine
- APCO Project 25 Two-Way Radio System
- Kad Network
- GSM network
- Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators
- Automobiles, ...



#### Rules of Thumb

Be conservative: evaluate security under the best conditions for the adversary


□ A system is as secure as the weakest link.

□ It is best to plan for unknown attacks.



## Security & Risk

- □ The risk due to a set of attacks is the expected (or average) cost per unit of time.
- One measure of risk is Annualized Loss



incidence



#### Risk Reduction

 $\Box$  A defense mechanism may reduce the risk of a set of attacks by reducing  $L_A$  or  $p_A$ . This is the gross risk reduction (GRR):

$$\sum_{A} (p_A \times L_A - p'_A \times L'_A)$$
 attack A

□ The mechanism also has a cost. The net risk reduction (NRR) is GRR – cost.



# **Bug Bounty Program**

- Evans (Google): "Seeing a fairly sustained drop-off for the Chromium"
- McGeehan (Facebook): The bounty program has actually outperformed the consultants they hire.
- Google: Patching serious or critical bugs within 60 days
- □ Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Mozilla, Samsung, ...



# Nations as a Bug Buyer

- ReVuln, Vupen, Netragard: Earning money by selling bugs
- "All over the world, from South Africa to South Korea, business is booming in what hackers call zero days"
- "No more free bugs."
- 'In order to best protect my country, I need to find vulnerabilities in other countries'
- Examples
  - Critical MS Windows bug: \$150,000
  - a zero-day in iOS system sold for \$500,000
  - Vupen charges \$100,000/year for catalog and bug is sold separately
  - ▶ Brokers get 15%.



# Sony vs. Hackers

2000 8 2005 10 2007 | 20111 20114 2011.4 Sony Exec Russinovich FTC Hotz Sony Hotz PSN do whatever to Sony Reimburse PS3 Hack settled Hacked protect re 2011. 3 \$36.27 per share Son 1/2 day 2011. 6 \$24.97 Per Share ologized recov 20115 20115 20116 20123 SOE Anon Sony Sony Fired Hacked Outage cost Posted Unreleased \$171M Michael Jackson video security



#### Patco Construction vs. Ocean Bank

- □ Hacker stole ~\$600K from Patco through Zeus
- The transfer alarmed the bank, but ignored
- "commercially unreasonable"
  - Out-of-Band Authentication
  - User-Selected Picture
  - Tokens
  - Monitoring of Risk-Scoring Reports



#### Auction vs. Customers

#### Auction's fault

- Unencrypted Personal Information
- It did not know about the hacking for two days
- Passwords
  - » 'auction62', 'auctionuser', 'auction'
- Malwares and Trojan horse are found in the server.

#### Not gulity, because

- Hacker utilized new technology, and were well-organized.
- Auctions have too many server.
- AVs have false alarms.
- For large company like auction, difficult to use.
- Causes massive traffic.



#### Cost of Data Breach

Ponemon Cost of Data Breach Study: 12th year in measuring cost of data breach

Company	Year	Data	Cost (USD)
Anthem	2015	80 M patient and employee records	100M
Ashley Madison	2015	33 M user accounts	850M
Ebay	2014	145M customer accounts	200M
JPMorgan Chase	2014	Financial/Personal Info of 76 M Personal, 7M Small B	1000M
Home Depot	2014	56 M credit card and 53 M email addresses.	80 M
Sony Pictures	2014	Personal Information of 3,000 employees	35 M
Target	2013	40 M credit and debit card, 70 M customer	252 M
Global Payments	2012	1.5M card accounts	90 M
Tricare	2011	5 M Tricare Military Beneficiary	130 M
Citi Bank	2011	360,000 Credit Card	19 M
Hearland	2009	130M Card	2800 M



#### Security theater is the practice of

- investing in countermeasures intended to provide the feeling of improved security
- while doing little or nothing to actually achieve it
  - Bruce Schneier



# Security of New Technologies


- Most of the new technologies come with new and old vulnerabilities.
  - Old vulnerabilities: OS, Network, Software Security, ...
  - Studying old vulnerabilities is important, yet less interesting.
  - e.g. Stealing Bitcoin wallet, Drone telematics channel snooping
- New Problems in New Technologies
  - Sensors in Self-Driving Cars and Drones
  - Security of Deep Learning
  - Block Chain Pool Mining Attacks
  - Brain Hacking



# Basic Cryptography




# The Main Players





#### **Attacks**












# Taxonomy of Attacks

- □ Passive attacks
  - Eavesdropping
  - Traffic analysis

- □ Active attacks
  - Masquerade
  - Replay
  - Modification of message content
  - Denial of service




# Encryption




- □ Why do we use key?
  - Or why not use just a shared encryption function?




#### SKE with Secure channel



#### PKE with Insecure Channel



# Public Key should be authentic!




#### Hash Function

- A hash function is a function h satisfying
  - h:{0, 1}\* → {0, 1}k (Compression)
- A cryptographic hash function is a hash function satisfying
  - It is easy to compute y=h(x) (ease of computation)
  - For a given y, it is hard to find x' such that h(x')=y.(onewayness)
  - It is hard to find x and x' such that h(x)=h(x') (collision resistance)
- □ Examples: SHA-1, MD-5



#### How Random is the Hash function?





# Applications of Hash Function

□ File integrity



- □ Digital signature
   Sign = S<sub>SK</sub>(h(m))
- □ Password verificationstored hash = h(password)

- □ File identifier
- □ Hash table

Generating random numbers



#### Hash function and MAC

- A hash function is a function h
  - compression
  - ease of computation
  - Properties

```
» one-way: for a given y, find x' such that h(x') = y
```

- » collision resistance: find x and x' such that h(x) = h(x')
- Examples: SHA-1, MD-5
- MAC (message authentication codes)
  - both authentication and integrity
  - MAC is a family of functions h<sub>k</sub>
    - » ease of computation (if k is known !!)
    - » compression, x is of arbitrary length,  $h_k(x)$  has fixed length
    - » computation resistance
  - Example: HMAC



#### MAC construction from Hash

#### □ Prefix

- M=h(k||x)
- appending y and deducing h(k||x||y) form h(k||x) without knowing k

#### □ Suffix

- ▶ M=h(x||k)
- ▶ possible a birthday attack, an adversary that can choose x can construct x' for which h(x)=h(x') in  $O(2^{n/2})$

#### □ STATE OF THE ART: HMAC (RFC 2104)

- ▶ HMAC(x)=h(k||p<sub>1</sub>||h(k|| p<sub>2</sub>||x)), p1 and p2 are padding
- The outer hash operates on an input of two blocks
- Provably secure




## How to use MAC?


- □ A & B share a secret key k
- □ A sends the message x and the MAC
   M←H<sub>k</sub>(x)
- □ B receives x and M from A
- $\square$  B computes  $H_k(x)$  with received M
- $\Box$  B checks if M=H<sub>k</sub>(x)



## PKE with Insecure Channel




## Digital Signature




- □ Integrity
- Authentication
- □ Non-repudiation



# Digital Signature with Appendix





$$s^* = S_{A,k}(m_h)$$

$$u = V_A(m_h, s^*)$$



#### Authentication

- □ How to prove your identity?
  - Prove that you know a secret information
- When key K is shared between A and Server
  - A → S: HMAC<sub>K</sub>(M) where M can provide freshness
  - Why freshness?
- □ Digital signature?
  - $\rightarrow$  A  $\rightarrow$  S: Sig<sub>SK</sub>(M) where M can provide freshness
- □ Comparison?



## **Encryption and Authentication**

 $\Box E_{K}(M)$ 

- $\square$  Redundancy-then-Encrypt:  $E_K(M, R(M))$
- □ Hash-then-Encrypt: E<sub>K</sub>(M, h(M))
- $\square$  Hash and Encrypt:  $E_K(M)$ , h(M)
- $\square$  MAC and Encrypt:  $E_{h1(K)}(M)$ , HMAC<sub>h2(K)</sub>(M)
- $\square$  MAC-then-Encrypt:  $E_{h1(K)}(M, HMAC_{h2(K)}(M))$



## Challenge-response authentication

- □ Alice is identified by a *secret* she possesses
  - Bob needs to know that Alice does indeed possess this secret
  - Alice provides response to a time-variant challenge
  - Response depends on both secret and challenge

#### Using

- Symmetric encryption
- One way functions



# Challenge Response using SKE

- □ Alice and Bob share a key *K*
- Taxonomy
  - Unidirectional authentication using timestamps
  - Unidirectional authentication using random numbers
  - Mutual authentication using random numbers
- Unilateral authentication using timestamps
  - ▶ Alice  $\rightarrow$  Bob:  $E_K(t_A, B)$
  - Bob decrypts and verified that timestamp is OK
  - Parameter B prevents replay of same message in B → A direction



## Challenge Response using SKE

- Unilateral authentication using random numbers
  - $\rightarrow$  Bob  $\rightarrow$  Alice:  $r_b$
  - ▶ Alice  $\rightarrow$  Bob:  $E_K(r_b, B)$
  - $\triangleright$  Bob checks to see if  $r_b$  is the one it sent out
    - » Also checks "B" prevents reflection attack
  - r<sub>b</sub> must be non-repeating
- Mutual authentication using random numbers
  - ▶ Bob  $\rightarrow$  Alice:  $r_b$
  - ▶ Alice  $\rightarrow$  Bob:  $E_K(r_a, r_b, B)$
  - ▶ Bob  $\rightarrow$  Alice:  $E_{\kappa}(r_a, r_b)$
  - $\triangleright$  Alice checks that  $r_a$ ,  $r_b$  are the ones used earlier



# Challenge-response using OWF

- $\square$  Instead of encryption, used keyed MAC  $h_K$
- Check: compute MAC from known quantities, and check with message
- □ SKID3
  - $\triangleright$  Bob  $\rightarrow$  Alice:  $r_b$
  - ▶ Alice → Bob:  $r_a$ ,  $h_K(r_a, r_b, B)$
  - ▶ Bob  $\rightarrow$  Alice:  $h_K(r_a, r_b, A)$



## Key Establishment, Management

#### Key establishment

- Process to whereby a shared secret key becomes available to two or more parties
- Subdivided into key agreement and key transport.

#### □ Key management

- The set of processes and mechanisms which support key establishment
- The maintenance of ongoing keying relationships between parties




## Kerberos vs. PKI vs. IBE

□ Still debating ©


□ Let's see one by one!



# Kerberos (cnt.)



# Kerberos (Scalable)





## Public Key Certificate

- Public-key certificates are a vehicle
  - public keys may be stored, distributed or forwarded over unsecured media
- □ The objective
  - make one entity's public key available to others such that its authenticity and validity are verifiable.
- □ A public-key certificate is a data structure
  - data part
    - » cleartext data including a public key and a string identifying the party (subject entity) to be associated therewith.
  - signature part
    - » digital signature of a certification authority over the data part
    - » binding the subject entity's identity to the specified public key.



#### CA

- a trusted third party whose signature on the certificate vouches for the authenticity of the public key bound to the subject entity
  - The significance of this binding must be provided by additional means, such as an attribute certificate or policy statement.
- the subject entity must be a unique name within the system (distinguished name)
- The CA requires its own signature key pair, the authentic public key.
- □ Can be off-line!



# **ID-based Cryptography**

- □ No public key
- □ Public key = ID (email, name, etc.)
- □ PKG
  - Private key generation center
  - $\triangleright$  SK<sub>ID</sub> = PKG<sub>S</sub>(ID)
  - PKG's public key is public.
  - distributes private key associated with the ID
- □ Encryption: C= E<sub>ID</sub>(M)
- $\square$  Decryption:  $D_{SK}(C) = M$



## Discussion (PKI vs. Kerberos vs. IBE)

- □ On-line vs. off-line TTP
  - Implication?
- □ Non-reputation?
- □ Revocation?
- □ Scalability?
- □ Trust issue?



## Questions?

#### □ Yongdae Kim

```
Pemail: yongdaek@kaist.ac.kr
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Pacebook: https://www.facebook.com/y0ngdaek
Pacebook: https://twitter.com/yongdaek
Poogle "Yongdae Kim"
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