EE488 Introduction to Cryptography Engineering

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Key Management

- Key establishment
 - Process to whereby a shared secret key becomes available to two or more parties
 - Subdivided into key agreement and key transport.
- Key management
 - The set of processes and mechanisms which support key establishment
 - The maintenance of ongoing keying relationships between parties



Key Management Through SKE



Pros

- Easy to add and remove entities
- Each entity needs to store only one long-term secret key

Cons

- Initial interaction with the TTP
- TTP needs to maintain n long-term secret keys
- TTP can read all messages
- Single point of failure



Key Management Through PKE

0xDAD12345	Alice
0xBADD00D1	Bob

1. Alice, PK_A 2. Bob, PK_B SK_A, PK_A SK_B, PK_B

Advantages

- TTP not required
- Only *n* public keys
 need to be stored
- The central repository could be a local file

□ Problem

- Public key authentication problem
- Solution
 - Need of TTP to certify the public key of each entity



Kerckhoff's Principle

- Security should depend only on the key
 - Don't assume enemy won't know algorithm
 - » Can capture machines, disassemble programs, etc.
 - » Too expensive to invent new algorithm if it might have been compromised
 - Security through obscurity isn't
 - » Look at history of examples
 - » Better to have scrutiny by open experts
- "The enemy knows the system being used." (Claude Shannon)



Block Cipher

■ E: $V_n \times K \rightarrow V_n$ $\downarrow V_n = \{0,1\}^n, K = \{0, 1\}^k, n \text{ is called block length, k is called key size}$ $\downarrow E(P, K) = C \text{ for } K \in K \text{ and } P, C \in V_n$ $\downarrow E(P, K) = E_K(P) \text{ is invertible mapping from } V_n \text{ to } V_n$

- » E_{K} : encryption function
- ▷ $D(C, K) = D_K(C)$ is the inverse of E_K
 - » D_k : decryption function







Modes of Operation

A block cipher encrypts plaintext in fixed-size n-bit blocks (often n =128). What happens if your message is greater than the block size?



SysSec System Security Lab

Modes of Operation

□ ECB

- Encryption: $c_j \leftarrow E_K(x_j)$
- ▶ Decryption: $x_j \leftarrow E^{-1}_{K}(c_j)$
- □ CBC
 - ▶ Encryption: $c_0 \leftarrow IV$, $c_j \leftarrow E_K(c_{j-1} \oplus x_j)$
 - ▶ Decryption: $c_0 \leftarrow IV$, $x_j \leftarrow c_{j-1} \oplus E^{-1}_K(c_j)$
- □ CFB
 - ▷ Encryption: $I_1 \leftarrow IV$, $c_j \leftarrow x_j \oplus E_K(I_j)$, $I_{j+1} = c_j$
 - ▶ Decryption: $I_1 \leftarrow IV$, $x_j \leftarrow c_j \oplus E_K(I_j)$, $I_{j+1} = c_j$
- □ OFB
 - ▶ Encryption: $I_1 \leftarrow IV$, $o_j = E_K(I_j)$, $c_j \leftarrow x_j \oplus o_j$, $I_{j+1} = o_j$
 - ▷ Decryption: $I_1 \leftarrow IV$, $o_j = E_K(I_j)$, $x_j \leftarrow c_j \oplus o_j$, $I_{j+1} = o_j$



Modes of Operation (CTR)











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CTR advantages

- Hardware efficiency
 - ▹ Parallelizable
- Software efficiency
 - Similar, modern processors support parallel computation
- Preprocessing
 - Pad can be computed earlier
- Random-access
 - Each ciphertext block can be encrypted independently
 - important in applications like hard-disk encryption
- Provable security
 - no worse than what one gets for CBC encryption
- Simplicity
 - No decryption algorithm and key scheduling



Double DES

- □ $C = E_{K2}[E_{K1} [P]]$ □ $P = D_{K1}[D_{K2}[C]]$
- □ Reduction to single stage?
 - ▷ E_{K2}[E_{K1} [P]] =? E_{K3}[P]
 - It was proven that it does not hold



Meet-in-the-middle Attack

- Diffie 1977
- □ Exhaustively cracking it requires 2¹¹²?
- $\Box C = E_{K2}[E_{K1} [P]]$
 - ▶ $X = E_{K1} [P] = D_{K2} [C]$
- □ Given a known pair, (P, C)
 - ▶ Encrypt P with all possible 2⁵⁶ values of K₁
 - Store this results and sort by X
 - ▶ Decrypt C with all possible 2⁵⁶ K₂, and check table
 - If same, accept it as the correct key
- □ Are we done? &&#@!#(





Meet-in-the-middle Attack, cnt

Little statistics

- ▶ For any P, there are 2⁶⁴ possible C
- ▷ DDES uses 112 bit key, so 2¹¹² keys
- ▶ Given C, there are $2^{112}/2^{64} = 2^{48}$ possible P
 - » So there are 248 false alarms
- ▶ If one more (P', C') pair, we can reduce it to 2⁻¹⁶
- So using two (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs, we can break
 DDES c * 2⁵⁶ encryption/decryption
- $\Box C = E_{K2}[D_{K1} [P]] \text{ different?}$



Triple DES with two keys

- Obvious counter to DDES: Use three keys
 - Complexity?
 - ▹ 168 bit key

Triple DES = EDE = encrypt-decrypt-encrypt

- ▶ $C = E_{K1}[D_{K2} [E_{K1}[P]]]$
- □ Attacks?
 - No practical one so far



Product Cipher

- To build complex function to compose several simple operation offer complementary, but individually insufficient protection
- Basic operation: transposition, translation (XOR) and linear transformation, arithmetic operation, mod mult, simple substitution
- Substitution-permutation (SP) network is product cipher composed of a number of stages each involving substitution and permutation





Feistel Cipher

- Virtually all conventional block ciphers
 - ▶ by Horst Feistel of IBM in 1973
- The realization of a Feistel Network depends on the choice of the following parameters and features:
 - Block size: larger block sizes mean greater security
 - ▶ Key Size: larger key size means greater security
 - Number of rounds: multiple rounds offer increasing security
 - Subkey generation algorithm: greater complexity will lead to greater difficulty of cryptanalysis.
 - Fast software encryption/decryption: the speed of execution of the algorithm becomes a concern



Feistel Network

□ iterated cipher mapping (L_0, R_0) to (R_r, L_r) through rround process, $(L_{i-1}, R_{i-1}) \rightarrow_{Ki} (L_i, R_i)$ as follows $\downarrow_i = R_{i-1}, R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f(R_{i-1}, K_i), K_i$ is derived from K





Feistel Network - Why it works?

- 2 Round example
- Encryption
 - $L_1 = \mathsf{R}_{0,} \, \mathsf{R}_1 = \mathsf{L}_0 \oplus \mathsf{f}(\mathsf{K}_1, \, \mathsf{R}_0)$
 - ▶ $L_2 = R_1 = L_0 \oplus f(K_1, R_0), R_2 = L_1 \oplus f(K_2, R_1)$
- Decryption
 - $\triangleright \quad \mathsf{R}_1 = \mathsf{L}_{2,} \, \mathsf{L}_1 = \mathsf{R}_2 \oplus \mathsf{f}(\mathsf{K}_2, \, \mathsf{R}_1)$
 - $\triangleright \quad \mathsf{R}_0 = \mathsf{L}_1, \, \mathsf{L}_0 = \mathsf{R}_1 \oplus \mathsf{f}(\mathsf{K}_1, \, \mathsf{R}_0)$
- Easily extensible to multi-round



DES History

- Originated with early 1970's IBM effort to develop banking security systems
- First result was Lucifer, most common variant has 128-bit key and block size
 - ▹ Broken
- □ NBS (Currently NIST) called for Algorithms in 1973
- IBM submitted the best algorithm in 1977 and that became DES
 - ▹ Original IBM key size = 128, DES = 56 :-)
 - Design philosophy of S-Box was unknown
 - » Turned out to be strong



DES Overview

 \square |P|, |C| = 64, |K| = 56, 16 rounds, K ! sixteen 48-bit subkeys K_i are generated







S-Box

□ 6 bit input, 4 bit output
 □ 27 = 011011 = (01) (1101)
 □ S₁-Box output for 27 = 5





New Era!

DES broken

- ▶ DES III Challenge by RSA
- Idle CPU time of around 100,000 computers
- ▹ In 22 hours



□ Triple DES?

- Original DES was designed for H/W implementation
- 64 bit block size too small for security and efficiency

□ Now what?



Advanced Encryption Standard

- □ In 1997, NIST issued a call for proposal
 - Block length = 128 bit
 - ▶ Key size = 128, 192, 256 bits
- □ In the first round, 15 algorithms were accepted
- □ Second round, 5 algorithms were selected
- In November 2001, final standard was published
 - ▶ Rijndel, FIPS PUB 197
 - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
 - Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen





AES Evaluation Criteria

Security

- Actual security: compared with other submissions
- Randomness: output is indistinguishable from random
- Soundness: of mathematical basis
- Other security factors: raised by security community

Cost

- No licensing: World-wide, non-exclusive, royalty-free
- Computation efficiency: both S/W and H/W
- Memory requirements
- Algorithm and Implementation characteristics
 - Flexibility: key-/block-size, wide variety of platforms
 - Simplicity



Stream Cipher

- Definition
 - encrypt individual characters of plaintext message one at a time, using encryption transformation which varies with time.
- Block vs. Stream
 - Block ciphers
 - » process plaintext in relatively large blocks
 - » The same function is used to encrypt successive blocks \Rightarrow memoryless
 - ▶ stream ciphers
 - » process plaintext in small blocks, and the encryption function may vary as plaintext is processed \Rightarrow have memory
 - » sometimes called state ciphers since encryption depends on not only the key and plaintext, but also on the current state.
 - This distinction between block and stream ciphers is not definitive
 adding memory to a block cipher (as in CBC) results in a stream cipher



One-time Pad and Stream Cipher

One-time pad

- ▶ Vernam cipher: $c_i = m_i \oplus x_i$ for $i = 1, 2, 3 \cdots$
- key is generated independently and randomly
- Ciphertext contributes no information about plain text
- $\$ key should be as long as plaintext \Rightarrow key management
- Stream cipher tries to solve this problem having short key and generate pseudo-random sequence
 - Not unconditionally secure, but try to be computationally secure



Questions?

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