EE515/IS523
Think Like an Adversary
Lecture 2 Intro+Crypto

Yongdae Kim

KAIST

SysSec
System Security Lab

Admin

- Homepage
  - http://security101.kr
- Survey
  - Find your group members and discuss about projects

Rules of Thumb

- Be conservative: evaluate security under the best conditions for the adversary

- A system is as secure as the weakest link.

- It is best to plan for unknown attacks.

Security & Risk

- The risk due to a set of attacks is the expected (or average) cost per unit of time.
- One measure of risk is Annualized Loss Expectancy, or ALE:

$$\sum_{\text{attack } A} \overbrace{(p_A \times L_A)}^{\text{ALE of attack A}}$$

ALE of attack A

p_A: Annualized attack incidence

L_A: Cost per attack

Risk Reduction

- A defense mechanism may reduce the risk of a set of attacks by reducing L_A or p_A. This is the gross risk reduction (GRR):

$$\sum_{\text{attack A}} (p_A \times L_A - p'_A \times L'_A)$$

- The mechanism also has a cost. The net risk reduction (NRR) is GRR – cost.

Bug Bounty Program

- Evans (Google): “Seeing a fairly sustained drop-off for the Chromium”
- McGeehan (Facebook): The bounty program has actually outperformed the consultants they hire.
- Google: Patching serious or critical bugs within 60 days
- Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Mozilla, Samsung, …

Nations as a Bug Buyer

- ReVuln, Vupen, Netragard: Earning money by selling bugs
- “All over the world, from South Africa to South Korea, business is booming in what hackers call zero days”
- “No more free bugs.”
- ‘In order to best protect my country, I need to find vulnerabilities in other countries’
- Examples
  - Critical MS Windows bug: $150,000
  - a zero-day in iOS system sold for $500,000
  - Vupen charges $100,000/year for catalog and bug is sold separately
  - Brokers get 15%.

Sony vs. Hackers

2000.8	2005.10	2007.1	2011.1	2011.4	2011.4
Sony Exec	Russinovich	FTC	Hotz	Sony, Hotz	PSN
do whatever to	Sony	Reimburse	PS3 Hack	settled	Hacked

protect re

2011.

Son

½ day

recov

2011. 3 $36.27 per share

2011. 6 $24.97 per share

2011.5

ny Exec

ologized

2011.5	2011.5	2011.6	2012.3
SOE	Sony	Sony	Anon
Hacked	outage cost	Fired	Posted Unreleased
	$171M	security	Michael Jackson video

Patco Construction vs. Ocean Bank

- Hacker stole ~$600K from Patco through Zeus
- The transfer alarmed the bank, but ignored

- “commercially unreasonable”
  - Out-of-Band Authentication
  - User-Selected Picture
  - Tokens
  - Monitoring of Risk-Scoring Reports

Auction vs. Customers

- Auction’s fault
  - Unencrypted Personal Information
  - It did not know about the hacking for two days
  - Passwords
    - ‘auction62’, ‘auctionuser’, ‘auction’
  - Malwares and Trojan horse are found in the server.

- Not gulity, because
  - Hacker utilized new technology, and were well-organized.
  - Auctions have too many server.
  - AVs have false alarms.
  - For large company like auction, difficult to use.
  - Causes massive traffic.

Cost of Data Breach

Ponemon Cost of Data Breach Study: 12th year in measuring cost of data breach

Company	Year	Data	Cost (USD)
Anthem	2015	80 M patient and employee records	100M
Ashley Madison	2015	33 M user accounts	850M
Ebay	2014	145M customer accounts	200M
JPMorgan Chase	2014	Financial/Personal Info of 76 M Personal, 7M Small B	1000M
Home Depot	2014	56 M credit card and 53 M email addresses.	80 M
Sony Pictures	2014	Personal Information of 3,000 employees	35 M
Target	2013	40 M credit and debit card, 70 M customer	252 M
Global Payments	2012	1.5M card accounts	90 M
Tricare	2011	5 M Tricare Military Beneficiary	130 M
Citi Bank	2011	360,000 Credit Card	19 M
Hearland	2009	130M Card	2800 M

Security theater is the practice of

- investing in countermeasures intended to provide the feeling of improved security
- while doing little or nothing to actually achieve it

- Bruce Schneier

Security of New Technologies

- Most of the new technologies come with new and old vulnerabilities.
  - Old vulnerabilities: OS, Network, Software Security, …
  - Studying old vulnerabilities is important, yet less interesting.
  - e.g. Stealing Bitcoin wallet, Drone telematics channel snooping

- New Problems in New Technologies
  - Sensors in Self-Driving Cars and Drones
  - Security of Deep Learning
  - Block Chain Pool Mining Attacks
  - Brain Hacking

Basic Cryptography

The Main Players



Attacks



Normal Flow
Source
Destination
Interruption: Availability
Source
Destination
Interception: Confidentiality
Source
Destination
Modification: Integrity
Source
Destination
Fabrication: Authenticity
Source
Destination

Taxonomy of Attacks

- Passive attacks
  - Eavesdropping
  - Traffic analysis

- Active attacks
  - Masquerade
  - Replay
  - Modification of message content
  - Denial of service

Encryption



- Why do we use key?
  - Or why not use just a shared encryption function?

SKE with Secure channel



PKE with Insecure Channel



Public Key should be authentic!



Hash Function

- A hash function is a function h satisfying
  - $h:\{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ (Compression)
- A cryptographic hash function is a hash function satisfying
  - It is easy to compute y=h(x) (ease of computation)
  - For a given y, it is hard to find x' such that h(x')=y. (onewayness)
  - It is hard to find x and x' such that h(x)=h(x') (collision resistance)
- Examples: SHA-1, MD-5

How Random is the Hash function?



Applications of Hash Function

- File integrity

Instructions

The Windows SDK is available as a DVD ISO image file so that you can bu
that you are downloading the correct ISO file, please refer to the table bel
to validate that the file you've downloaded is the correct file.

==

File Name: GRMSDK_EN_DVD.iso

Chip: X86

CRC#: 0xCA4FE79D

WalkerNews.net

SHA1: 0x8695F5E6810D84153181695DA78850988A923F4E

- Digital signature

  Sign = $S_{SK}(h(m))$

- Password verification

stored hash = h(password)

- File identifier
- Hash table
- Generating random numbers

Hash function and MAC

- A hash function is a function h
  - compression
  - ease of computation
  - Properties
    - one-way: for a given y, find x' such that h(x') = y
    - collision resistance: find x and x' such that h(x) = h(x')
  - Examples: SHA-1, MD-5

- MAC (message authentication codes)
  - both authentication and integrity
  - MAC is a family of functions h_k
    - ease of computation (if k is known !!)
    - compression, x is of arbitrary length, $h_k(x)$ has fixed length
    - computation resistance
  - Example: HMAC

MAC construction from Hash

- Prefix
  - M=h(k||x)
  - appending y and deducing h(k||x||y) form h(k||x) without knowing k
- Suffix
  - M=h(x||k)
  - possible a birthday attack, an adversary that can choose x can construct x' for which h(x)=h(x') in $O(2^{n/2})$
- STATE OF THE ART: HMAC (RFC 2104)
  - HMAC(x)=h(k||p_1||h(k|| p_2||x)), p1 and p2 are padding
  - The outer hash operates on an input of two blocks
  - Provably secure

How to use MAC?

- A & B share a secret key k
- A sends the message x and the MAC $M \leftarrow H_k(x)$
- B receives x and M from A
- B computes $H_k(x)$ with received M
- B checks if $M = H_k(x)$

PKE with Insecure Channel



Digital Signature

- Integrity
- Authentication
- Non-repudiation

Digital Signature with Appendix



$$s^* = S_{A,k}(m_h)$$

$$u = V_A(m_h, s^*)$$

Authentication

- How to prove your identity?
  - Prove that you know a secret information
- When key K is shared between A and Server
  - A ➔ S: $HMAC_K(M)$ where M can provide freshness
  - Why freshness?
- Digital signature?
  - A ➔ S: $Sig_{SK}(M)$ where M can provide freshness
- Comparison?

Encryption and Authentication

- $E_K(M)$

- Redundancy-then-Encrypt: $E_K(M, R(M))$
- Hash-then-Encrypt: $E_K(M, h(M))$
- Hash and Encrypt: $E_K(M), h(M)$
- MAC and Encrypt: $E_{h1(K)}(M), HMAC_{h2(K)}(M)$
- MAC-then-Encrypt: $E_{h1(K)}(M, HMAC_{h2(K)}(M))$

Challenge-response authentication

- Alice is identified by a *secret* she possesses
  - *Bob* needs to know that Alice does indeed possess this secret
  - *Alice* provides ***response*** to a time-variant ***challenge***
  - Response depends on ***both*** secret and challenge

- Using
  - Symmetric encryption
  - One way functions

Challenge Response using SKE

- Alice and Bob share a key *K*
- Taxonomy
  - ***Unidirectional*** authentication using ***timestamps***
  - ***Unidirectional*** authentication using ***random numbers***
  - ***Mutual*** authentication using ***random numbers***
- Unilateral authentication using timestamps
  - Alice → Bob: $E_K(t_A, B)$
  - Bob decrypts and verified that timestamp is OK
  - Parameter *B* prevents replay of same message in B → A direction

Challenge Response using SKE

- Unilateral authentication using random numbers
  - Bob → Alice: r_b
  - Alice → Bob: $E_K(r_b, B)$
  - Bob checks to see if r_b is the one it sent out
    - » Also checks "*B*" – prevents reflection attack
  - r_b must be ***non-repeating***
- Mutual authentication using random numbers
  - Bob → Alice: r_b
  - Alice → Bob: $E_K(r_a, r_b, B)$
  - Bob → Alice: $E_K(r_a, r_b)$
  - Alice checks that r_a, r_b are the ones used earlier

Challenge-response using OWF

- Instead of encryption, used keyed MAC h_K
- Check: compute MAC from *known quantities*, and check with message
- SKID3
  - Bob $\rightarrow$ Alice: r_b
  - Alice $\rightarrow$ Bob: r_a, $h_K(r_a, r_b, B)$
  - Bob $\rightarrow$ Alice: $h_K(r_a, r_b, A)$

Key Establishment, Management

- Key establishment
  - Process to whereby a shared secret key becomes available to two or more parties
  - Subdivided into key agreement and key transport.

- Key management
  - The set of processes and mechanisms which support key establishment
  - The maintenance of ongoing keying relationships between parties

Kerberos vs. PKI vs. IBE

- Still debating ☺
- Let's see one by one!

Kerberos (cnt.)

- $E_{kBT}(k, A, L)$: Token for B
- $E_{kAT}(k, N_A, L, B)$: Token for A
- L: Life-time
- N_A?
- $E_k(A, T_A, A_{subkey})$: To prove B that A knows k
- T_A: Time-stamp
- $E_k(B, T_A, B_{subkey})$: To prove A that B knows k



Kerberos (Scalable)



Public Key Certificate

- Public-key certificates are a vehicle
  - public keys may be stored, distributed or forwarded over unsecured media
- The objective
  - make one entity's public key available to others such that its authenticity and validity are verifiable.
- A public-key certificate is a data structure
  - data part
    - cleartext data including a public key and a string identifying the party (subject entity) to be associated therewith.
  - signature part
    - digital signature of a certification authority over the data part
    - binding the subject entity's identity to the specified public key.

CA

- a trusted third party whose signature on the certificate vouches for the authenticity of the public key bound to the subject entity
  - The significance of this binding must be provided by additional means, such as an attribute certificate or policy statement.
- the subject entity must be a unique name within the system (distinguished name)
- The CA requires its own signature key pair, the authentic public key.
- Can be off-line!

ID-based Cryptography

- No public key
- Public key = ID (email, name, etc.)
- PKG
  - Private key generation center
  - $SK_{ID} = PKG_S(ID)$
  - PKG's public key is public.
  - distributes private key associated with the ID
- Encryption: $C = E_{ID}(M)$
- Decryption: $D_{SK}(C) = M$

Discussion (PKI vs. Kerberos vs. IBE)

- On-line vs. off-line TTP
  - Implication?
- Non-reputation?
- Revocation?
- Scalability?
- Trust issue?

Questions?

- Yongdae Kim
  - email: yongdaek@kaist.ac.kr
  - Home: http://syssec.kaist.ac.kr/~yongdaek
  - Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/y0ngdaek
  - Twitter: https://twitter.com/yongdaek
  - Google "Yongdae Kim"