

# Network Security: Intrusion Detection

---

Seungwon Shin, KAIST

most slides from Dr. Guofei Gu

# Some Definition

---


- Intrusion
  - ▶ A set of actions aimed to compromise the security goals, namely
    - Integrity, confidentiality, or availability, of a computing and networking resource
- Intrusion detection
  - ▶ The process of identifying and responding to intrusion activities



# Why Is Intrusion Detection Necessary?

---

- Protect your systems from intrusion



*Security principles: layered mechanisms*


# Elements of IDS

---

- Primary assumptions:
  - ▶ System activities are observable
  - ▶ Normal and intrusive activities have distinct evidence
    - Components of intrusion detection systems:
- From an algorithmic perspective:
  - ▶ Features - capture intrusion evidences
  - ▶ Models - piece evidences together
- From a system architecture perspective:
  - ▶ Audit data processor, knowledge base, decision engine, alarm generation and responses

# Components of IDS

---



# IDS Approachs

---

- Modeling

- ▶ Features: evidences extracted from audit data

- ▶ Analysis approach: piecing the evidences together

- **Misuse detection (signature-based, e.g., Snort, Bro)**

- **Anomaly detection (e.g., statistical-based)**

- Deployment

- ▶ Network-based

- ▶ Host-based


- Development and maintenance

- ▶ Hand-coding of “expert knowledge”

- ▶ Learning based on audit data

# Misuse Detection

---




Example: *if* (src\_ip == dst\_ip) *then* "land attack"

**Cannot detect unknown attacks**

# Anomaly Detection

---




**Relatively high false positive rate - anomalies can just be new normal activities.**



# Monitoring Network and Hosts

---



# Performance Metric

---


- Algorithm
  - ▶ **Alarm: A; Intrusion: I**
  - ▶ Detection (true positive) rate:  $P(A|I)$ 
    - False negative rate  $P(\neg A|I)$
  - ▶ False positive rate:  $P(A|\neg I)$ 
    - True negative rate  $P(\neg A|\neg I)$
  - ▶ Bayesian detection rate:  $P(I|A)$
- Architecture
  - ▶ Scalable
  - ▶ Resilient to attacks

Alarm (detection result)

		T	F
Intrusion (Reality)	T	True Positive	False Negative
	F	False Positive	True Negative

# ROC Curve

---



- Ideal system should have
  - ▶ 100% detection rate with 0% false alarm

# HIDS

---

- Using OS auditing mechanisms
  - ▶ E.G., BSM on Solaris: logs all direct or indirect events generated by a user
  - ▶ **strace** for system calls made by a program
- Monitoring user activities
  - ▶ E.G., Analyze shell commands
- Monitoring executions of system programs
  - ▶ E.G., Analyze system calls made by sendmail

# HIDS - Example

---

- A Sense of Self - Immunology Approach
  - ▶ Prof. Forrest at University of New Mexico
    - Anomaly detection
    - Simple and short sequences of events to distinguish “self” from not
    - Currently looking at system calls (strace)
    - Apply to detection of lpr and sendmail

# Some More


---

- Anomaly detection for Unix processes
  - ▶ “Short sequences” of system calls as normal profile
    - (Forrest et al. UNM)

*...,open,read,mmap,mmap,open,getrlimit,mmap,close,...*

↓ Sliding window of length  $k$

...  
*open,read,mmap,mmap*  
*read,mmap,mmap,open*  
*mmap,mmap,open,getrlimit*  
*mmap,open,getrlimit,mmap*  
...



# NIDS



---

- Deploying sensors at strategic locations
  - ▶ E.G., Packet sniffing via tcpdump at routers
- Inspecting network traffic
  - ▶ Watch for violations of protocols and unusual connection patterns
- Monitoring user activities
  - ▶ Look into the data portions of the packets for malicious command sequences
- Maybe easily defeated by encryption
  - ▶ Data portions and some header information can be encrypted
- Other problems...

# Firewall vs. NIDS

---

- Firewall
  - ▶ Active filtering
  - ▶ Fail-close
- Network IDS
  - ▶ Passive monitoring
  - ▶ Fail-open





# NIDS Requirements

---

- High-speed, large volume monitoring
  - ▶ No packet filter drops
- Real-time notification
- Mechanism separate from policy
- Extensible
- Broad detection coverage
- Economy in resource usage
- Resilience to stress
- Resilience to attacks upon the IDS itself!

# Two Well-known NIDS

---



**Bro**

**Alternative?**




# Bro

---

## Vern Paxson at ICSI


### remember TRW?

Bro: A System for Detecting Network Intruders in Real-Time  
- USENIX Security 1998



# Bro: How it works

---




- Taps GigEther fiber link passively, sends up a copy of all network traffic.

Bro

# Bro: How it works


---



- Kernel filters down high-volume stream via standard *libpcap* packet capture library.

# Bro: How it works


---



- “Event engine” distills filtered stream into high-level, *policy-neutral* events reflecting underlying network activity
  - E.g. Connection-level:
    - connection attempt
    - connection finished
  - E.g. Application-level:
    - ftp request
    - http\_reply
  - E.g. Activity-level:
    - login success

# Bro: How it works

---




- “Policy script” processes event stream, incorporates:
  - Context from past events
  - Site’s particular policies

# Snort

---

**open source**  
**SourceFire leads this project**  
**now commercial??**





# Snort: Rule

---

```
action proto.      src. IP    src. port dst. IP dst. port  
alert tcp 192.168.2.0/24 23 -> any any \  
      (content: "confidential"; msg: "Detected confidential";)  
      contents
```

# Eluding NIDS

---

- What the IDS sees may not be what the end system gets.
  - ▶ Insertion and evasion attacks.
    - IDS needs to perform full reassembly of packets.
  - ▶ But there are still ambiguities in protocols and operating systems:
    - E.G. TTL, fragments.
    - Need to “normalize” the packets.

# Insertion Attack

---

End-System sees:

A T T A C K

IDS sees:

A T X T A C K

Attacker's data stream

T X T C A A K

Examples: bad  
checksum,  
TTL.

# Evasion Attack

---

End-System sees:

A T T A C K

IDS sees:

A T T C K

Attacker's data stream

T T C A A K

Example:  
fragmentation  
overlap

# Summing up

---

- Network intrusion

- ▶ A set of actions aimed to compromise the security goals, namely
  - Integrity, confidentiality, or availability, of a computing and networking resource

- Detecting network intrusion

- ▶ Method

- misuse vs. anomaly

- ▶ Placement

- Host level

- AV-tools

- Network level

- Snort, Bro