

Network Security: Botnet

Seungwon Shin
GSIS, KAIST


many slides from Dr. Yan Chen

Definition

- Bot
 - ▶ a software application that runs automated tasks over the Internet
- Botnet
 - ▶ a collection of Internet-connected programs communicating with other similar programs in order to perform tasks




Botnet




Botnet Threat

- Botnets are a major threat to the Internet because:
 - ▶ Consist of a large pool of compromised computers that are organized by a master.
 - a.k.a., Zombie Armies
 - ▶ Carry out sophisticated attacks to disrupt, gather sensitive data, or increase armies
 - ▶ Armies are in the 1000's to aggregate computing power
 - ▶ Communication network allows bots to evolve on a compromised host

Bot Infection - Mariposa



Bot Infection - Conficker



Botnet example - AgoBot

- Most sophisticated
 - ▶ 20,000 lines C/C++ code
- IRC based command/control
- Large collection of target exploits
- Capable of many DoS attack types
- Shell encoding/polymorphic obfuscation
- Traffic sniffers/key logging
- Defend/fortify compromised system
- Ability to frustrate disassembly

Botnet example - SDBot

- Simpler than Agobot, 2,000 lines C code
- Non-malicious at base
- Utilize IRC-based command/control
- Easily extended for malicious purposes
 - ▶ Scanning
 - ▶ DoS Attacks
 - ▶ Sniffers
 - ▶ Information harvesting

Botnet Taxonomy

- | |
|--------------------------------|
| ● Attacking Behavior |
| ● C&C Models |
| ● Rally Mechanisms |
| ● Communication Protocols |
| ● Observable botnet activities |
| ● Evasion Techniques |

Attacking Behavior

Attack Behaviors

- Infecting new hosts
 - ▶ Social engineering and distribution of malicious emails or other electronic communications (i.e. Instant Messaging)
 - Example - Email sent with botnet disguised as a harmless attachment.
- Stealing personal information
 - ▶ Keylogger and Network sniffer technology used on compromised systems to spy on users and compile personal information
- Phishing and spam proxy
 - ▶ Aggregated computing power and proxy capability make allow spammers to impact larger groups without being traced.
- Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
 - ▶ Impair or eliminate availability of a network to extort or disrupt business

C&C Model

Command and Control

- Essential for operation and support of botnet
 - ▶ 3 Styles
 - Centralized
 - P2P
 - Randomized
- Weakest link of the botnet because:
 - ▶ Elimination of botmaster takes out the botnet
 - ▶ High level of activity by botmaster makes them easier to detect than their bots


Centralized C&C

- Simple to deploy, cheap, short latency for large scale attacks
- Easiest to eliminate



P2P C&C


- Resilient to failures, hard to discover, hard to defend.
- Hard to launch large scale attacks because P2P technologies are currently only capable of supporting very small groups (< 50 peers)



From centralized botnet to hybrid peer-to-peer botnet

P2P C&C: Storm Bot

- The Overnet network that Storm uses is extremely dynamic.
- Peers come and go and can change OIDs frequently.
- In order to stay “well connected” peers must periodically search for themselves to find nearby peers:



P2P C&C: Storm Bot

Storm Bot message passing

Connect:

A peer uses connect messages to report their OID to other peers and to receive a list of peers somewhat close to the peer.

Search:


A peer uses search messages to find resources and other nodes based on OID.

Publicize:

A peer uses publicize messages to report ownership of network resources (OIDs) so that other peers can find the resource later.

P2P C&C: Zeus Bot

Zeus v3 P2P Network



Randomized C&C

- Theoretical architecture
 - ▶ Evan Cooke, et al describe the model
- Easy implementation and resilient to discovery and destruction
- Scalability limitations make it impractical for large scale attacks.
- Bots sleep and are not activated until Bot Master is ready to attack

Rally Mechanism

Rally Mechanism

- Hard-coded IP address
 - ▶ The bot communicates using C&C IP addresses that are hard-coded in its binary files.
 - ▶ Easy to defend against, as IP addresses are easily detectable and blocked, which makes the bot useless.



Rallying Mechanism

- Dynamic DNS Domain Name
 - ▶ Hard-coded C&C domains assigned by dynamical DNS providers.
 - ▶ Detection harder when botmaster randomly changes the location
 - ▶ Easier to resume attack with new, unblocked Domain Name
 - ▶ If connection fails the bot performs DNS queries to obtain the new C&C address for redirection.

Rallying Mechanism

- Distributed DNS Service
 - ▶ Hardest to detect & destroy.
 - ▶ Newest mechanism.
 - ▶ Sophisticated.
 - ▶ Botnets run own DNS service out of reach of authorities
 - ▶ Bots use the DNS addresses to resolve the C&C servers
 - ▶ Use high port numbers to avoid detection by security devices and gateways

FastFlux



Communication Protocol


Communication Protocol

- In most cases botnets use well defined and accepted Communication Protocols.
- Understanding the communication protocols used helps to:
 - ▶ Determine the origins of a botnet attack and the software being used
 - ▶ Allow researchers to decode conversations happening between the bots and the masters
- There are two main Communication Protocols used for bot attacks:
 - ▶ IRC
 - ▶ HTTP
 - ▶ P2P
 - ▶ Custom protocol

IRC Protocol

- IRC Botnets were the predominant version
 - ▶ IRC mainly designed for one to many conversations but can also handle one to one
 - ▶ IRC servers are:
 - freely available
 - easy to manage
 - Attackers have experience with IRC
 - ▶ IRC bots usually have a way to remotely upgrade victims with new payloads to stay ahead of security efforts
- Most corporate networks does not allow any IRC traffic so any IRC requests can determine and external or internal bot
 - ▶ Outbound IRC requests means an already infected computer on the network
 - ▶ Inbound IRC requests mean that a network computer is being recruited

IRC Botnet



```
(12:59:27pm) -- A9-pcgbdv (A9-pcgbdv@140.134.36.124)
has joined (#owned) Users : 1646
```

```
(12:59:27pm) (@PhaTTy) .ddos.synflood 216.209.82.62
```

```
(12:59:27pm) -- A6-bpxufrd (A6-bpxufrd@wp95-
81.introweb.nl) has joined (#owned) Users : 1647
```

```
(12:59:27pm) -- A9-nzmpah (A9-nzmpah@140.122.200.221)
has left IRC (Connection reset by peer)
```

```
(12:59:28pm) (@PhaTTy) .scan.enable DCOM
```

```
(12:59:28pm) -- A9-tzrkeasv (A9-tzrkeasv@220.89.66.93)
has joined (#owned) Users : 1650
```

HTTP Protocol

- Due to prevalence of HTTP usage it is harder to track a botnet that uses HTTP Protocols
- Using HTTP can allow a botnet to skirt the firewall restrictions that hamper IRC botnets
- Detecting HTTP botnets is harder but not impossible since the header fields and the payload do not match usual transmissions
- Some new options emerging are IM and P2P protocols and expect growth here in the future

Botnet Activities

Botnet Activities

- Three categories of observable Botnet behaviors:
 - ▶ Network-based
 - ▶ Host-based
 - ▶ Global Correlated

Network Activities

- Network patterns can be used to detect Botnets
 - ▶ IRC & HTTP are the most common forms of Botnet communications
 - ▶ Detectable by identifying abnormal traffic patterns.
 - IRC communications in unwanted areas
 - IRC conversations that human's can not understand
- DNS domain names
 - ▶ DNS queries to locate C&C server
 - ▶ Hosts query improper domain names
 - ▶ IP address associated with a domain name keeps changing periodically
- Traffic
 - ▶ Bursty at times, and idle the rest of the time
 - ▶ Abnormally fast responses compared to a human
 - ▶ Attacks
 - E.g., (Denial of Service) Large amounts of invalid TCP SYN Packets with invalid source IP addresses

Host Activities

- Botnet behavior can be observed on the host machine.
 - ▶ Exhibit virus like activities
 - ▶ When executed, Botnets run a sequence of routines.
 - Modifying registries
 - Modifying system files
 - Creating unknown network connections
 - Disabling Antivirus programs

Global Activities

- Global characteristics are tied to the fundamentals Botnets
 - ▶ Not likely to change unless Botnets are completely redesigned and re-implemented
 - ▶ Most valuable way to detect Botnets
- Behavior the same regardless if the Botnets are communicating via IRC or HTTP
 - ▶ Global DNS queries increase due to assignment of new C&C servers
 - ▶ Network Flow disruptions

Evasion Technique

Evasion Ways

- Sophistication of Botnets allow them to evade
 - ▶ AV Engines
 - ▶ Signature base intrusion detection systems (IDS)
 - ▶ Anomaly-based detection systems

- Techniques
 - ▶ Executable packers
 - ▶ Rootkits
 - ▶ Protocols

Evasion Ways

- Moving away from IRC
- Taking control of
 - ▶ HTTP
 - ▶ VoIP
 - ▶ IPV6
 - ▶ ICMP
 - ▶ Skype protocols

Collect Bot Samples

BotLab - Collect Storm Bot

