

EE817/IS 893

cryptology Engineering and
cryptocurrency

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Admin Stuff

- Mar 13 midnight: Homework 1 submission
- Mar 14 morning: Homework 1 solution posting
- Mar 19 class: Quiz 1

- About 2 weeks after: Homework 2, Quiz 2

- About 2 weeks after: Homework 3, midterm, ...

- Question on homework?

Recap

- ❑ Proof techniques
 - ▷ Direct/Indirect proof, Proof by contradiction, Proof by cases, Existential/universal Proof, Forward/backward reasoning
- ❑ Divisibility: a divides b ($a|b$) if $\exists c$ such that $b = ac$
- ❑ $d = \gcd(a,b)$ is the largest positive integer that divides both a and b , more formally, 1) $d > 0$, 2) $d | a$ and $d | b$, 3) $e | a$ and $e | b$ implies $e | d$
- ❑ $\text{lcm}(a,b)$ is the smallest positive integer divisible by both a and b
- ❑ Euclidean Algorithm
- ❑ $p \geq 2$ is prime if 1) $a | p \Rightarrow a = \pm 1$ or $\pm p$
- ❑ Prime number theorem: $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \pi(x)/(x/\ln x) = 1$
- ❑ Euler phi function: For $n \geq 1$, let $f(n)$ denote the number of integers in $[1, n]$ which are relatively prime to n .
- ❑ Pairwise relatively prime!
- ❑ $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ if m divides $a-b$
- ❑ a^* is an arithmetic inverse of a modulo n , if $a a^* \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.
- ❑ cardinality, counting, discrete probability, ...
- ❑ oneway function, Trapdoor oneway function
- ❑ Symmetric key cryptography, public key cryptography

Key Management


□ Key establishment

- ▷ Process to whereby a shared secret key becomes available to two or more parties
- ▷ Subdivided into key agreement and key transport.

□ Key management

- ▷ The set of processes and mechanisms which support key establishment
- ▷ The maintenance of ongoing keying relationships between parties

Key Management Through SKE



□ Pros


- ▷ Easy to add and remove entities
- ▷ Each entity needs to store only one long-term secret key

□ Cons

- ▷ Initial interaction with the TTP
- ▷ TTP needs to maintain n long-term secret keys
- ▷ TTP can read all messages
- ▷ Single point of failure

Key Management Through PKE

0xDAD12345	Alice
0xBADD00D1	Bob



Advantages

- ▷ TTP not required
- ▷ Only n public keys need to be stored
- ▷ The central repository could be a local file

Problem

- ▷ Public key authentication problem

Solution

- ▷ Need of TTP to certify the public key of each entity

Public key certificates

- Entities trust a third party, who issues a certificate

- certificate = (data part, signature part)
 - ▷ Data part = (name, public-key, other information)
 - ▷ Signature = (signature of TTP on data part)

- If B wants to verify authenticity of A's public key
 - ▷ Acquire public key certificate of A over a secured channel
 - ▷ verify TTP's signature
 - ▷ If signature verified A's public key in the certificate is authentic

Symmetric vs. Public key

	Pros	cons
SKE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ High data throughput■ Relatively short key size	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ The key must remain secret at both ends■ $O(n^2)$ keys to be managed■ Relatively short lifetime of the key
PKE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ $O(n)$ keys■ Only the private key must be kept secret■ longer key life time■ digital signature	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Low data throughput■ Much larger key sizes

Kerckhoff's Principle

- Security should depend only on the key
 - ▷ Don't assume enemy won't know algorithm
 - » can capture machines, disassemble programs, etc.
 - » Too expensive to invent new algorithm if it might have been compromised
 - ▷ Security through obscurity isn't
 - » Look at history of examples
 - » Better to have scrutiny by open experts

- "The enemy knows the system being used." (Claude Shannon)

ID-based cryptography

- No public key
- Public key = ID (email, name, etc.)
- PKG
 - ▷ Private key generation center
 - ▷ $SK_{ID} = PKG_S(ID)$
 - ▷ PKG's public key is public.
 - ▷ distributes private key associated with the ID
- Encryption: $c = E_{ID}(M)$
- Decryption: $D_{SK}(c) = M$

DISCUSSION (PKI vs. Kerberos vs. IBE)

On-line vs. off-line TTP

▷ Implication?

Non-reputation?

Revocation?

Scalability?

Trust issue?

Block cipher

□ $E: V_n \times K \rightarrow V_n$

▷ $V_n = \{0, 1\}^n$, $K = \{0, 1\}^k$, n is called block length, k is called key size


▷ $E(P, K) = c$ for $K \in K$ and $P, c \in V_n$

▷ $E(P, K) = E_k(P)$ is invertible mapping from V_n to V_n

» E_k : encryption function





▷ $D(c, K) = D_k(c)$ is the inverse of E_k

» D_k : decryption function



Modes of operation

- A block cipher encrypts plaintext in fixed-size n -bit blocks (often $n = 128$). What happens if your message is greater than the block size?



Modes of operation

□ ECB

▷ Encryption: $c_j \leftarrow E_k(x_j)$

▷ Decryption: $x_j \leftarrow E_k^{-1}(c_j)$

□ CBC

▷ Encryption: $c_0 \leftarrow IV, c_j \leftarrow E_k(c_{j-1} \oplus x_j)$

▷ Decryption: $c_0 \leftarrow IV, x_j \leftarrow c_{j-1} \oplus E_k^{-1}(c_j)$

□ CFB

▷ Encryption: $l_1 \leftarrow IV, c_j \leftarrow x_j \oplus E_k(l_j), l_{j+1} = c_j$



▷ Decryption: $l_1 \leftarrow IV, x_j \leftarrow c_j \oplus E_k(l_j), l_{j+1} = c_j$

□ OFB

▷ Encryption: $l_1 \leftarrow IV, o_j = E_k(l_j), c_j \leftarrow x_j \oplus o_j, l_{j+1} = o_j$

▷ Decryption: $l_1 \leftarrow IV, o_j = E_k(l_j), x_j \leftarrow c_j \oplus o_j, l_{j+1} = o_j$

Modes of operation (CTR)



CTR advantages

- ❑ Hardware efficiency
 - ▷ Parallelizable
- ❑ Software efficiency
 - ▷ Similar, modern processors support parallel computation
- ❑ Preprocessing
 - ▷ Pad can be computed earlier
- ❑ Random-access
 - ▷ Each ciphertext block can be encrypted independently
 - ▷ important in applications like hard-disk encryption
- ❑ Provable security
 - ▷ no worse than what one gets for CBC encryption
- ❑ Simplicity
 - ▷ No decryption algorithm and key scheduling

Double DES

$$\square C = E_{K_2}[E_{K_1}[P]]$$

$$\square P = D_{K_1}[D_{K_2}[C]]$$

□ Reduction to single stage?

$$\triangleright E_{K_2}[E_{K_1}[P]] =? E_{K_3}[P]$$

▷ It was proven that it does not hold

Meet-in-the-middle Attack

□ Diffie 1977

□ Exhaustively cracking it requires 2^{112} ?

□ $C = E_{k_2}[E_{k_1}[P]]$

▷ $X = E_{k_1}[P] = D_{k_2}[C]$

□ Given a known pair, (P, c)


▷ Encrypt P with all possible 2^{56} values of k_1

▷ Store this results and sort by X

▷ Decrypt c with all possible 2^{56} k_2 , and check table

▷ If same, accept it as the correct key

□ Are we done?



Meet-in-the-middle Attack, cnt

□ Little statistics

- ▷ For any P , there are 2^{64} possible c
- ▷ DDES uses 112 bit key, so 2^{112} keys
- ▷ Given c , there are $2^{112}/2^{64} = 2^{48}$ possible P
 - » So there are 2^{48} false alarms
- ▷ If one more (P', c') pair, we can reduce it to 2^{-16}

□ So using two (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs, we can break DDES $c * 2^{56}$ encryption/decryption

□ $c = E_{k_2}[D_{k_1}[P]]$ different?



Triple DES with two keys

□ Obvious counter to DDES: use three keys

▷ complexity?

▷ 168 bit key

□ Triple DES = EDE = encrypt-decrypt-encrypt


$$\triangleright C = E_{K_1}[D_{K_2}[E_{K_1}[P]]]$$

□ Attacks?

▷ No practical one so far

Product cipher

- ❑ To build complex function to compose several simple operation offer complementary, but individually insufficient protection
- ❑ Basic operation: transposition, translation (XOR) and linear transformation, arithmetic operation, mod mult, simple substitution
- ❑ Substitution-permutation (SP) network is product cipher composed of a number of stages each involving substitution and permutation




Feistel cipher

- ❑ Virtually all conventional block ciphers
 - ▷ by Horst Feistel of IBM in 1973
- ❑ The realization of a Feistel Network depends on the choice of the following parameters and features:
 - ▷ Block size: larger block sizes mean greater security
 - ▷ Key Size: larger key size means greater security
 - ▷ Number of rounds: multiple rounds offer increasing security
 - ▷ Subkey generation algorithm: greater complexity will lead to greater difficulty of cryptanalysis.
 - ▷ Fast software encryption/decryption: the speed of execution of the algorithm becomes a concern

Feistel Network

□ iterated cipher mapping (L_o, R_o) to (R_r, L_r) through r -round process, $(L_{i-1}, R_{i-1}) \xrightarrow{k_i} (L_i, R_i)$ as follows

▷ $L_i = R_{i-1}$, $R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f(R_{i-1}, k_i)$, k_i is derived from k



Feistel Network - Why it works?

□ 2 Round example

□ Encryption

$$\triangleright L_1 = R_0, R_1 = L_0 \oplus f(k_1, R_0)$$

$$\triangleright L_2 = R_1, R_2 = L_1 \oplus f(k_2, R_1)$$

□ Decryption

$$\triangleright R_1 = L_2, L_1 = R_2 \oplus f(k_2, R_1)$$

$$\triangleright R_0 = L_1, L_0 = R_1 \oplus f(k_1, R_0)$$



□ Easily extensible to multi-round

DES History

- ❑ Originated with early 1970's IBM effort to develop banking security systems
- ❑ First result was Lucifer, most common variant has 128-bit key and block size
 - ▷ Broken
- ❑ NBS (currently NIST) called for Algorithms in 1973
- ❑ IBM submitted the best algorithm in 1977 and that became DES
 - ▷ Original IBM key size = 128, DES = 56 :-)
 - ▷ Design philosophy of S-Box was unknown
 - » Turned out to be strong

DES Overview

- $|P|, |C| = 64, |K| = 56, 16$ rounds, K ! sixteen 48-bit subkeys K_i are generated




S-Box

- ❑ 6 bit input, 4 bit output
- ❑ $27 = 011011 = (01) (1101)$
- ❑ S_1 -Box output for 27 = 5

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
0	14	4	13	1	2	15	11	8	3	10	6	12	5	9	0	7
1	0	15	7	4	14	2	13	1	10	6	12	11	9	5	3	8
2	4	1	14	8	13	6	2	11	15	12	9	7	3	10	5	0
3	15	12	8	2	4	9	1	7	5	11	3	14	10	0	6	13

New Era!



□ DES broken

- ▷ DES III challenge by RSA
- ▷ Idle CPU time of around 100,000 computers
- ▷ In 22 hours

□ Triple DES?

- ▷ Original DES was designed for H/W implementation
- ▷ 64 bit block size too small for security and efficiency

□ Now what?

Advanced Encryption Standard

- ❑ In 1997, NIST issued a call for proposal
 - ▷ Block length = 128 bit
 - ▷ Key size = 128, 192, 256 bits
- ❑ In the first round, 15 algorithms were accepted
- ❑ Second round, 5 algorithms were selected
- ❑ In November 2001, final standard was published
 - ▷ Rijndel, FIPS PUB 197
 - ▷ <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>
 - ▷ Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen



AES Evaluation criteria

□ Security

- ▷ Actual security: compared with other submissions
- ▷ Randomness: output is indistinguishable from random
- ▷ Soundness: of mathematical basis
- ▷ Other security factors: raised by security community

□ Cost

- ▷ No licensing: world-wide, non-exclusive, royalty-free
- ▷ Computation efficiency: both S/W and H/W
- ▷ Memory requirements

□ Algorithm and Implementation characteristics

- ▷ Flexibility: key-/block-size, wide variety of platforms
- ▷ Simplicity

Stream cipher

□ Definition

- ▷ encrypt individual characters of plaintext message one at a time, using encryption transformation which varies with time.

□ Block vs. Stream

▷ Block ciphers

- » process plaintext in relatively large blocks
- » The same function is used to encrypt successive blocks \Rightarrow memoryless

▷ Stream ciphers

- » process plaintext in small blocks, and the encryption function may vary as plaintext is processed \Rightarrow have memory
- » sometimes called state ciphers since encryption depends on not only the key and plaintext, but also on the current state.

▷ This distinction between block and stream ciphers is not definitive

- » adding memory to a block cipher (as in CBC) results in a stream cipher

One-time Pad and Stream cipher

□ One-time pad

▷ Vernam cipher: $c_i = m_i \oplus x_i$ for $i = 1, 2, 3 \dots$

👍 key is generated independently and randomly

👍 ciphertext contributes no information about plain text

👎 key should be as long as plaintext \Rightarrow key management

□ Stream cipher tries to solve this problem having short key and generate pseudo-random sequence

▷ Not unconditionally secure, but try to be computationally secure

QUESTIONS?

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